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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a domestic relations determination, 
which is within this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-
2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment for the Plaintiff by determining that no substantial 
change in Plaintiff's income and financial circumstance had 
occurred since the entry of the divorce decree not contemplated 
within the divorce decree itself. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855, P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994). 
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666) 
2. Whether the district court erred in denying summary 
judgment for the Defendant for a reduction or termination of 
alimony by determining that no substantial change in Plaintiff's 
income and financial circumstance had occurred since the entry of 
the divorce decree not contemplated within the divorce decree 
itself. 
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Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Higqins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855, P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah App. 1994) . 
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666) 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding Plaintiff's attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Wells v. Wells, 
871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994); Utah Dep't of Social 
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991). 
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666) 
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in 
denying an award of Defendant's attorneys fees. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Wells v. Wells, 
871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994); Utah Dep't of Social 
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991) . 
Issue Preserved: (R. 475-512 & R. 654-666) 
2 
GOVERNING STATUTES 
The issues presented on appeal are governed by the following 
statutes: 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order - Judgment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support 
under any child support order, as defined by Subsection 
62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of 
any judgment of a district court, except as provided in 
Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit 
in this and in any other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or 
any other jurisdiction, except as provided in 
Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any period 
during which a petition for modification is pending, but 
only from the date notice of that petition was given to the 
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the 
obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad 
faith - Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, 
except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only 
if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce modification proceeding involving issues 
of substantial changed circumstances for modification of alimony. 
On June 17, 1993, Defendant Jack Jones brought a Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce. (R. 240-42) The parties 
conducted some discovery, and Plaintiff Diane Jones brought a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on September 6, 1994. (R. 399) Jack 
filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on September 26, 1994. 
(R. 473-74) After oral argument, the district court denied Jack's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, denied Jack's requested attorney 
fees, granted Diane's Motion for Summary Judgment, and awarded 
attorney fees to Diane. (R. 707-10, Addendum, hereafter "Add.," 
52-55) Summary Judgment was entered on January 3, 1995. (R. 
724-26, Add. 57-59) Jack thereafter filed a timely Appeal on 
January 27, 1995, challenging the grant of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the denial of his Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment, as well as the grant and denial of attorney fees. (R. 
730-31) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Diane Jones and Defendant Jack Jones were Married 
on July 1, 1973, in Anchorage, Alaska. (Affidavit of Jack Lloyd 
Jones, R. 495, Add. 44, K 2) When they were first married, Diane 
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worked outside the home for approximately three years. (Add. 44-
45, H 4) After long discussion, however, it was decided that 
Diane would quit work and pursue a career in law. Diane made a 
commitment that she would follow through and become a practicing 
attorney so that both she and Jack could enjoy the financial and 
other benefits of having a working attorney in the family. (Add. 
44-45, H 4) 
At the time Diane decided to attend law school, there were 
no law schools in Alaska. Therefore, Jack left a job offer for 
over $60,000 per year and relocated to Utah. Jack accepted a job 
paying $12,000 per year, and financially and emotionally 
supported Diane through law school. (Add. 45, 1 5) Diane 
attended Law School from September of 1976 until the Spring of 
1979. She passed the Utah Bar exam in the Summer of 1979. 
Diane's tuition, law books, and other support was paid by Jack. 
(Add. 45, H 6) On September 3, 1979, Diane gave birth to the 
parties first and only child, Amber M. Jones. (Add. 44, f 3) 
During the parties marriage they lived quite frugally. The 
most expensive cars they ever owned were a new AMC Javelin which 
they purchased for approximately $3,400 and a used Thunderbird 
purchased for approximately $5,000. The monthly payments on 
these cars was never over $100 to $150 per month. (Add. 50, 1) 24) 
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From the time Diane passed the Utah Bar exam until their 
separation in April or May of 1991, Jack tried to persuade Diane 
to find employment and do something with her law degree as the 
parties had agreed in the beginning. Diane's refusal to seek 
employment was the main point of contention between the parties 
during those years. (Add. 45-4 6, % 7) Diane did do some minimal 
work such as establishing a tax preparation business on a small 
scale. She also took on a few cases as an attorney. However 
Diane did not obtain full time employment as was contemplated in 
the parties original discussions. (Add. 45-46, % 7) Even after 
Amber started school in 1984, Diane refused to work. (Add. 46, H 
8) 
In April or May of 1991, the parties marital problems became 
sufficiently severe that they separated. (Add. 46, 1 9) Diane 
filed for Divorce in June of 1991. (R. 2-10) The divorce took 
nearly 18 months, and included numerous proceedings. (Add. 46, 
Hil 9-12) In a temporary order, entered in June of 1991, the 
court granted Diane temporary alimony and child support combined 
at $1,500 per month, a very high rate. (R. 19) The court also 
ordered Diane to find employment, however, she failed to procure 
any. (Add. 46, 1 10) In January of 1992, Diane began her own 
law practice, but ran at a loss. (Financial Declaration, R. 86, 
Add. 34) 
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After Diane began her law practice, she stated repeatedly to 
Jack that she was not earning any money. In all the settlement 
discussions, Diane and her Attorney continually asserted that she 
was not making any income from her law practice and that all the 
income was being eaten up by expenses. (Add. 46, 1 12) Never did 
the parties contemplate what Diane might earn in her law practice 
to reduce the alimony she received. Alimony was based solely 
upon her representations that she was making $80 per month. 
(Add. 46 & 49, 11 12 & 19) 
On June 5, 1992, a pretrial conference was held. Jack and 
his attorney tried to get Diane to admit that she was making an 
income from her law practice. However, she would not. She 
continued to assert that she was not earning any profit besides 
the Eighty dollars ($80.00) income from caring for horses. (Add. 
46-48, 11 12-13) The parties therefore entered into a 
stipulation on the record based upon this income. (Add. 47, 1 13) 
Due to difficulties with dividing Jack's Deferred Income Plan, 
the parties had to rework this stipulation. (Add. 48, 1 16) 
In September of 1992, the parties hammered out another 
agreement and reduced the agreement to writing with the parties 
and their attorneys present. (Add. 48-49, 11 18-19) Diane was 
an attorney licensed to practice law at this time. (Add. 45, 1 6) 
The agreement was entered based on Diane's stated income of $80 
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per month and was signed and sworn to by the parties. 
(Stipulation for Entry of Decree of Divorce, hereafter 
"Stipulation," % 12, R. 143, Add. 7) 
Pursuant to the agreement, Jack was to pay $650 per month in 
alimony. (Add. 7, H 12) The parties also stipulated that Jack 
would have access to Diane's business records every six months so 
that alimony could be decreased as soon as Diane's income went up 
from $80 per month. (Add. 7-8, 1 12/Add. 48-49, 1 20) The 
parties further stipulated that Jack could petition the court for 
reduction in alimony based on changes in Diane's income from time 
to time, (Add. 7-8, ^ 12), and that Jack's obligation to pay 
alimony would terminate at such time as Diane was able to provide 
for her own support, but in any event would terminate at the end 
of 5 years. (Add. 7-8, 1 12). These terms were accepted by the 
court and incorporated into the court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree. (R. 153-154, Add. 16-17, ^ 14; R. 
161-162, Add. 25-26, H 13) 
The agreement also provided that Jack would pay child 
support of $43 0 per month consistent with the guidelines based on 
Diane's income of $80 per month. (Add. 2-3, % 2) Jack was not 
concerned about an increase in Diane's income increasing child 
support since an increase in her income would have very little 
effect on his child support obligation. (Add. 49, % 21) 
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Jack obtained Diane's business records in the latter part of 
March, 1993. The records showed a substantial increase in income 
from the $80 per month earned at the time of divorce. (Add. 50, 
1 23) Therefore, Jack filed a Petition to reduce or terminate 
alimony on June 10, 1993. (R. 240-42) 
Diane's monthly expenses increased from approximately $1,729 
at the time of the parties divorce in 1992 (R. 88, Add. 36) to 
$2,221 as of July 11, 1994. (R. 386, Add. 39/ Affidavit of Diane 
Jones, R. 430) These expenses include the costs and care 
associated with the parties' minor child. (Add. 39) The bulk of 
the increase has occurred in Diane's auto expenses and auto 
payments, which combined have gone from $100 to $584 per month. 
(Add. 3 6 & Add. 39). The increased auto expenses are due to her 
purchase of a vehicle worth approximately $20,000. (Add. 50 & R. 
430) 
In calendar 1993, Diane had gross monthly income of at least 
$1,773.00. (R. 429) From January through July of 1994, she had 
gross monthly income of at least $1,867.54, (R. 429-30), and has 
received additional income of $2,800.00 through barter and trade. 
(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Request for Admissions, 
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents, 
Interrogatories No 10 & 14, R. 515-17) Excluding the barter and 
trade income, Diane's income has increased by at least $1,693.00 
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per month in 1993 and by at least $1,787.00 in 1994 from the 
amount she was earning at the time of the parties' divorce. 
(Add. 48 and R. 429) This is an increase in income of at least 
$20,316 per year in 1993, and at least $21,444 on a yearly basis 
in 1994 over the income of Diane at the time of the divorce. She 
has had a 21 fold increase in her income. 
Diane moved for summary judgment on September 6, 1994, 
claiming that the alimony stipulation was not based on $80 per 
month as set forth in the stipulation and that the divorce decree 
itself anticipated future income from her law practice in 
reducing her alimony award. (R. 3 99-418) She also argued that 
Jack's petition for reduction or termination of alimony was 
frivolous and therefore warranted attorney fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Jack cross moved for summary judgment 
asserting that there had been a substantial change of 
circumstances as a matter of law, and that he was entitled to 
reduction or termination as a matter of law. (R. 473-94) He also 
claimed attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
The court granted summary judgment in Diane's favor ruling 
that her income from her law practice was contemplated in the 
decree itself, that Jack had not genuinely controverted any 
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment in Diane's 
favor, that Jack had not shown any reasonable probability of 
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prevailing at trial, and that Jack's petition for modification 
was frivolous warranting a grant of attorney fees of $4,146.00. 
(R. 707-10, Add. 52-55; R. 7, Add. 58) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court erred in granting Diane's motion for 
summary judgment and denying Jack's cross motion for summary 
judgment. The Stipulation for Entry of Decree of Divorce ( the 
"Stipulation") sworn to by the parties, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (the "Findings"), and the Decree of Divorce 
(the "Decree") are unambiguous and set forth $80 per month as 
Diane's income relied upon by the parties to establish the level 
of alimony. This issue is res judicata. The Decree specifically 
provided that as Diane's income increased, her alimony would 
decrease, and when she had sufficient income to support herself, 
alimony would terminate completely. Stipulations and Decrees are 
subject to construction according to the same rules that apply to 
all written contracts. Such contract should be interpreted to 
give all terms effect if possible. 
Diane's income is now sufficient to support herself at the 
standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. 
Therefore, Jack is entitled to termination of alimony as provided 
in the Stipulation, Findings, and Decree as a matter of law, 
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retroactive to June 10, 1993, the date of filing for 
modification. In the alternative, Diane's income has increased 
sufficiently to constitute a substantial change in circumstances 
as a matter of law. In order to give effect to all the terms of 
the Stipulation, Findings, and Decree providing for a reduction 
in alimony, Jack should be entitled to an appropriate reduction 
retroactive to June 10, 1993. Interpreting Diane's increased 
income as insufficient for a reduction in alimony makes the 
reduction terms of the stipulation of no effect. In the final 
alternative, if the court finds the Stipulation, Findings, and 
Decree are ambiguous, there are disputed issues of fact as to 
what the parties intended. Therefore, summary judgment is 
inappropriate, and the case should be remanded for trial on what 
the parties intended by their agreement. 
The district court abused its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to Diane. The facts show that Diane's income has 
increased substantially since the divorce, increasing from $80 to 
more than $1,700 per month, with her reasonable expenses in the 
same range. The petition to modify or terminate alimony was 
brought by Jack in good faith, believing that the increase in 
income was substantial for modification of alimony and based upon 
the advise of his attorneys. This belief was supported by the 
court commissioners recommendation that alimony be reduced and 
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therefore he pursued the proceeding further. (R. 3 90, Add. 43) 
Accordingly, Jack's petition was not without merit or brought in 
bad faith, and attorneys fees should not have been awarded to 
Diane. 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Jack's 
attorney fees. The undisputed facts show that Diane's income has 
increased substantially since the entry of the divorce. The 
agreement of the parties is unambiguously set out in the 
stipulation of the parties and provides for termination of 
alimony on Diane's ability to provide for her own support, and 
also for decreases of alimony when income increases occur below 
this level. Diane can now support herself. Therefore, Diane's 
defense that no modification of alimony should be made is 
frivolous and without merit, warranting attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD 
Ordinarily, denial of a motion for summary judgment is not 
appealable. However, where there are no issues of material fact, 
and the matter is before the court, the court has the power to 
direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of either party 
when both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
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Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 443 P.2d 385, 389 
(Utah 1968) . 
In reviewing a summary judgment, this court applies the 
analytical standard required of the trial court, liberally 
construing the facts and evidence in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) . No deference is given to the 
trial court's legal conclusions. Id. If the court concludes 
there is a material issue of fact, the case is remanded for a 
trial on that issue. Id. Courts should not weigh disputed facts 
in ruling on a summary judgment. It doesn't matter whether the 
evidence on one side seems strong or even compelling, one sworn 
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the 
averments and create an issue of fact precluding summary 
j udgment. Id. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, and if 
determined to be unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of 
law entitled to no deference by this court. Frontier 
Foundations, Inc. v. Layton Construction Co.f Inc., 818 P.2d 
1040, 1041-42 (Utah App. 1991). If the contract or judgment is 
ambiguous, and there is disputed facts as to what the parties 
intended, summary judgment is not appropriate, and evidence as to 
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what the parties intended should be received and considered, 
„,»; ,Ji:.y Seven Rodeo -,J?;•rp, Sj,ipi;_a,, 
II. TK ! : : COUirr ERRFD IN GRANTING DIANE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
\MKtr UP* DF.NYING JACKT MOTTON" FOR SUMMARY JODHMFNT 
Alimony W;p; .Sot; Based upon Diane's Income of. $00 per 
Month at; the Time of Divorce and Jack's Right to 
Petition for Modification upon Changed Circumstances Is 
Conclusively Established by the Stipulation, the 
Findings - * •"ho Decree, and ir res judicata. 
The unequivocal and unambiguous language of * he Stipulation 
' '• "* tie' s :i ncome 
n«- L .me ,;f $oi .a) poi month. ';;,• .;i i] uiaiaji: was signed by 
the parties on September ( ! • . :a : .*wo - *~" .;nder oath by 
] edge i 
14r)-'i«',, .•Ju-:, * '. Paragraph u. ui ;. in- i :pulation provides: 
The parlies s' ipulate and agree that plaintiffs present 
gross monthly income is $80.00 and rhat defendant's gross 
ithly income from his employment; is $4/300.00. Based upon 
3 respective parties' income as set forth herein, it is 
stipulated and agreed that the defendant will pay to the 
-'lintiff, alimony jn the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars 
JO. 00) per month. It is further agreed, however, that at 
such time as Defendant has paid to Plaintiff the sums 
immediately due and owing to her under the terms of this 
_.cement, a total of Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and 
Fifty Dollars, (14,250.00),, a ] :i mony shall be immediately 
reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and Fifty Dollars 
($650.00) per month. It is further agreed that defendant's 
obligation to pay alimony to the [plaintiff] shall terminate 
within five years from date of entry of a decree of divorce 
herein, or at such time as the Court may order based upon a 
change in plaintiff's circumstances and plaintiffs ability 
to provj de for her own support. 
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It is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of determining 
defendant's continued obligation to pay alimony to 
plaintiff, plaintiff will provide to defendant at his 
request, through her counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of 
plaintiff's business records and tax returns, for purposes 
of determining plaintiff's continued need to receive alimony 
from defendant. It is further agreed that defendant shall 
be entitled to receive such financial information from 
plaintiff every six months, and such information shall be 
provided by plaintiff to the defendant within thirty days 
after receiving written request therefore. It is agreed 
that the defendant may petition the Court, by way of a 
motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an 
adjustment of child support based on changes in the 
Plaintiff's income from time to time. 
(Add. 7-8, emphasis added). The Findings follow suit, and were 
signed and entered by the court on September 23, 1992. (R. 153-
54, Add. 17-18, H 14) The Decree was entered based on the 
Findings and stipulation at the same time. (R. 156-163, Add. 20-
17) Both the Findings and the Decree were approved as to form by 
Diane's counsel. (Add. 19 & 27) 
Diane's Memoranda in the trial court are replete with 
alleged facts not part of the parties' Stipulation. (R. 401 et 
seq.) She attempted to have the court look behind the 
Stipulation. But unless the documents are ambiguous, parole 
evidence should not be allowed. In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . when a decree is based upon a property settlement 
agreement, forged by the parties and sanctioned by the 
court, equity must take such agreement into consideration. 
Equity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges 
voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to 
regret the bargain made. Accordingly, the law limits the 
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continuing jurisdiction of the court where a property 
settlement agreement has been incorporated into the decree, 
and the outright abrogation of the provisions of such an 
agreement in only to be resorted to with great reluctance 
and f ~~ "omne"! 1 i ng reasons . 
Land v. Land, nos r.2d 3248, 1250-ni .'Utah 19PPX 'citations 
'"•'V!ft-od and emphasis adder lio Stipula* i ^ n is rot ambiguous 
III'.' I 'JL'. l . -' i 
should rr-,id t ho °ni ire stipulation as whole, cvia attempt i • 
harT"^nize and < ? i vo effect t-.> ill of th^ rv nit r a n ^rnvipionn." 
lMieisen v. P'ReiM; . 
attorney cat Lh** - ::: tha f.L ipu j at i on was signed and vui, a r 
represented uy counsel. ii i* * irti^r K->d relied en of-h^y-
income or anticipated income . •• : -J.-.I y 
had ihn hnnwl r>dgo and the representation to heave changed the 
.
 T>
 •• •"- ' > : 1^CL that. Instead, the c,tipul at: i or ^nd Findings 
clearly and unambiguously reflect that :r. L-a -n-.n^d 
upon the respective parties" income as set: forth ;T] herein. r' 
bed ng $80 0 0 j: n ^r month for Diane. (Add. 7, \\ 12 and Add. 1 1 , \ 
1,4) 
~*
 J
 h<'j 1 iuio r« negotiation, Diane insisted that she was 
m-'V' • • ' ~*r prar' ire nivi therefor was in need of 
al Linoiiy. (ArM : • i .-...
 ; s 
representation, Jack agreed to pay alimony at the specified 
lf' • -n ( * ! dd. 4'/-- ! 11 19) Diane now wishes to go beyond the 
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record and allege that alimony was based upon income that she had 
at the time, but was unwilling to disclose during negotiations. 
(R. 426-27, % 22) To allow Diane to do this would be manifestly 
unjust. The Stipulation and Findings clearly show that alimony 
was awarded based on Plaintiff's income of $80.00 per month, and 
not on any contemplation of future income. 
This court has stated that: 
. . . stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties 
unless, upon timely notice and for good cause shownf relief 
is granted therefrom. The appropriate procedure to provide 
such notice and obtain relief from a judgment based on a 
mistakenly executed stipulation is to file a motion pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), seeking relief because of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, lf 
within three months after the judgment order or proceeding 
was entered. 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah App. 1990) (citations 
omitted and emphasis added). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that 
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata 
as to those issues which were either tried and determined, 
or upon all issues which the party had a fair opportunity to 
present and have determined in the other proceeding. This 
principle also applies in the context of a divorce decree. 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) (citation 
omitted). In light of this court's and the Supreme Court's 
statements, the following facts are res judicata and conclusively 
established: 
a. Diane's income at the time of divorce was $80.00 per 
month. (Add. 7, f 12 and Add. 17, f 14) 
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b It was agreed on by the partis emu iuund uy i.no "t 
that Jack should pay alimony of $650.00 per month 
"based upon the respective parties' income as set 
forth" in the Stipulation nod t-1-- Fl :icH-nrrs ' T ^ 
12 and Add. 17, f14) 
c It was further agreed by the parties, found b;v the 
court, and decreed by the court that "defendant's 
obligati on to pay al:i mony to the [plaintiff] shall 
terminate within five years from date of entry of a 
decree of divorce herein, or at such time as the Court 
may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's 
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for 
her own support." (Add. 7, 1 12; Add. 17, % 14/Add. 25-
26, 1 12; 
,. .oo: o..oo agreed by the parties, foin id by the court, 
.ind decreed by the court that "the defendant may 
petition the Court, by way of a Motion, for a reduction 
in alimony payments and an adjustment of child support 
based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from time to 
time," '.Mrl/ ' ' * M;odd. 25-2*" c M ) 
The parties' "Lipulation creates a contractual framework 
W h u : •< o y • : O ' - ' < i' ' \-. > 'Oil 
i change in I". Lane1..; o i. rrumsi ancos and hej .ILL!*' .
 riu*. J*; 1. or 
her - m support. Upon changes J u i nconv - !)^ low providing ! wi :.. r 
alimony based < :. lane's increased I ricom- i i on ; nac ^ 
Regular contractual "ounl ructinn :i s applied *:r> ot opulations and 
some level of" increased income below providing ;<<, Diane*.> w,n 
support be sufficient for a reduction JLII -alimony. Otherwise, the 
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reduction provision would be of no effect since termination would 
be the only option available. 
No ambiguity exists in the documents here. The parties 
freely negotiated a stipulated settlement. This Stipulation was 
freely entered into and was a package deal with give and take. 
Diane is therefore bound by its terms may not look beyond the 
clear language of the document. 
B. Diane's Future Income from Her Law Practice Was Not 
Anticipated to Decrease Alimony Award. 
Diane contended in the court below that her income was 
anticipated to reduce the amount of the alimony award, and that 
this change in circumstance was therefore contemplated in the 
divorce decree itself and unavailable to modify the decree. (R. 
426-27, i( 22) This court has stated: 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated an increase 
of income in their own minds or in their discussions does 
not mean that the decree itself contemplates the change. In 
order for a material change in circumstances to be 
contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, 
preferably in the form of a provision within the decree 
itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific 
change. 
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah.App. 1990). No 
provision in the decree itself shows that the court anticipated 
Diane's income from her law practice to decrease alimony. Nor is 
there any evidence outside the record showing such a 
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contemplate on by the court. In fact, Liu-- n-l ipulation and Decree 
clearly :i i id:i cate the court' s and the hirfi ^c contemplation f~hat 
aid iiLony won] d be modi fied upon an inci eas- • ri -• iti, 'e . 
Johnson v. Johnson, this court held that a trial court 
h if • ii ILS contemplations with specificity in L.XI<J 
findings: 
Lij; .; " . . -*• ! knows that a party will be receiving 
additional future income it should make findings as to 
whether surh add 11- ioiia] income will affect the alimony 
award. 
[Lj.ir- i'iii:!, ""•«/, — — - :..3cretion, delay the determination 
of how the future income will affect the alimony award 
However, the trial court must make findings indicating that 
tl le future income has not: been considered in making the 
,. Tit award, fiuch findings will then allow the payiing 
spouse to bring a modification proceeding at; the appropriate 
* :me while sn« isfyin^ M i^ legal principles nrosented in Dana 
I Durfee. 
J O Ml 
(ci rations o^vttod and emphasis added) 'i.i-.- v ^ u> ! ;* = tins case 
f o] i ^ wed Johnson making specific findings regarding • he basis for 
decrease from Lime <o i uti-' as* DLane's mo^me iii^r^ased .owhere 
'^ the F.Lndinq". o\ Decree assert that alimony w;.!, not change on 
!. \\\i:,' •' ' J . I|l|,, x I1' i ndi IKJS In 
opposite to ho fr-in>, stating t.hat: 
. . . defendant's obligation to pay alimony to the 
[plaintiff] [sic] should terminate within five years from 
the entry of the decree of divorce herein, or at such time 
as the court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's 
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circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for her own 
support. 
. . . [T]he defendant may petition the Court, by way of 
a Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an 
adjustment of child support based on changes in the 
plaintiff's income from time to time. (Add. 17, H 14) 
This is not a case where the contemplated increase in income was 
taken into account to decrease the amount of alimony awarded. 
Diane's stated income at the time of divorce was the basis upon 
which the court awarded alimony at the level granted, and it was 
contemplated that when Diane's income increased, the alimony 
award would decrease accordingly. 
In the trial court, Diane relied entirely upon Moore v. 
Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah App. 1994). However, Moore is 
distinguishable. In Moore, the lower court's findings of fact on 
the Petition to Modify revealed that the lower court had 
anticipated the increased income of Mrs. Moore in setting the 
original alimony award. In this case, the Stipulation, Findings, 
and Decree show that Diane's anticipated income was not a factor 
in decreasing the amount of alimony awarded, but in fact could be 
used to decrease alimony as such income was received. The 
holding in Moore cannot be read as an abrogation of the 
unequivocal language of the Findings and Decree. Moore is 
further distinguishable in that the wife's income was still 
lacking more than $1,400.00 to make her reasonable monthly 
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expenses. Here, D:i ane's :i ncome is suffici ent to meet all of her 
reasonable monthly exponr^n at t:h^  standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. \L>*H, u , • • ) 
Month to Month Fluctuations in Income Is Insufficient 
Grounds !o Den\ . i PfVhint -: -^-- •'-• "limony. 
. * ho r i i.il ."ourt, Diane argued thru her income is o* 
.
 ( ;, • r,; r w,, . . -/able to terminate or rrdu"' 'l^m^nv fP /] ~J 
i!3) This arg ument is a red herring. •;_:<:: „• nar . :IL.J--
: "
,
- support horse.lf and cannot use her own lack •*! planning to 
income for dttorr "••"" "an be 
unstable, Jiow'--.-' , :.i the gooa i-i^ n. hs you save and in - _.. -Lti 
months you uso the saving to tide van «v/. • . Jnch i:hcoUl n t be 
5'ubstVMit ial Changes oi Circumstances lias Occurred 
'* Durfee , tliis court' restated the standard for 
On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree, the 
threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a 
substantial change of circumstances occurring since the 
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree 
itse] f 
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P. 2d 713,, 716 (Utah App. 199b) (Quoting 
Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P. 2d 690, 71-1 « * ih 198r;) 
pre v ious] y a-; • 1 ' * • " — • raw 
practice was nut. .mticipated oecreaso t lie amount of alimony 
originally awarded. What w^ls contemplated was that upon an 
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increase of Diane's income, Jack could petition for reduction or 
termination of alimony. 
There is no material issue of fact which disputes that Diane 
was earning $80.00 per month at the time of the parties divorce. 
The issue of Diane's income at the time of divorce has been 
conclusively established and is res judicata with respect to 
these parties. There is also no material issue of fact that 
Diane's monthly income for 1993 was at least $1,773.00 and her 
gross monthly income for 1994 was at least $1,867.54, even 
excluding her barter income of $2,800 in 1994. (R. 429-30, HH 31 
& 33) This is an increase in income of at least $1,693.00 per 
month in 1993 and at least $1,787.00 in 1994 above Diane's income 
at the time of divorce. This is an increase in income of at 
least $20,316 per year in 1993, and at least $21,444 per year in 
1994 over the income of the Plaintiff at the time of the divorce. 
She has had a 21 fold increase in her income. 
This case is similar to Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1982). In Haslam, at the time of divorce, the Defendant husband 
was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $200.00. This order was 
based on his income of between $1,000 and $1,200 per month. The 
plaintiff wife was unemployed at the time of divorce. Since the 
divorce, the plaintiff obtained a job earning $1,100 per month, 
the defendant's income remained approximately the same as at the 
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time of divorce, ami the plaintiff claimed expenses of 
• w - ] ; : • •-• : r. -.: r-] ' ' . The court reiterated thn*- : 
provisions in the original decree of divorce gram i.ng 
alimony, child support, and the like must be readily 
susceptible to alteration at a later date, as the needs 
vh! ch such provisions were designed to fill /ire subjer4- *~ ^ 
:..•> H and unprodi citable change. 
Ha si am (>f>7 I1. :M a i i quoting Foulger v. Fouigei , 
(Utah 1081 -^i r mi;L then went on to 1io3 d 4:hn- a substantial 
c n W'M •••',l ,:-,'":J had occurred under the r.-vtr ^r *~^ r case, 
and remanded tho <"• u-,rj for a determination of - n 
amount: t^ be made. Td.._ Diane has had a dramatic increase in 
ir - •'•'•.-•^  -;:-;-<r. :'KH^ ** • aaintiff in Ha si am. 
Similarly, Jack is entitled i<> judgment as a matter of law that a 
substantial change of circumstances liar; occurred. 
.' • i«* n- - ",. : /.- v.;reased Income Has Compensated for i i: -. * 
•1 i mony Awarded and She Can Now Provide for Rei Own 
oort. Therefore, Alimony Should Be Terminated, or at 
.* i-ii nimum, Reduced to an Appropriate Level, Ret ^active 
to June 10, 1993, the Date of the Petition for 
Modif icat i on 
This court has i leld that: 
the fundamental purpose of alimony ".,:.. i_; enable v.uc 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge." . . . The 
appropriate test to determine whether the termination in 
alimony was appropriate is whether plaintiff is now able to 
provide for herself a standard of living which is equal to 
that enjoyed during the marriage of the parties. 
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Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242-43 (Utah App. 1990) 
(Quoting Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)). The 
parties specifically provided in their stipulation that alimony 
would terminate when Diane was able to provide for her own 
support. (Add. 7, 1 12 and Add. 17, 1 14) 
The case at bar is similar to Bridenbaugh. In Bridenbaugh 
the original divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $400 per month 
alimony. At the time of the divorce, Plaintiff was not employed. 
She obtained a Master's degree in Social Work and was later 
employed at a yearly salary of $16,203.00 and was able to provide 
for her own support. The defendant's income increased from 
$30,000 at the time of divorce to $240,000 at the time of the 
petition for modification. Defendant conceded that he was able 
to pay alimony, but argued that there was a sufficient change in 
circumstances in plaintiff's income to terminate alimony. The 
court agreed holding that the lower court had not abused its 
discretion in terminating alimony. Likewise, in the case at bar, 
alimony should be terminated. 
Diane's income along with the child support she is receiving 
is sufficient to support herself and maintain the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage. She was awarded a 
substantial property settlement from the divorce and received all 
of the equity in the home, as well as $14,250.00 to pay the 
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second mortgage 01 i the home. (Add. 4-r " m€ ^ r 12) This 
settlement was part of th^ oackage deal '*'• • rh i n ^ ' u d ^ ^ niimv . 
As stated by Diane, ,!'T • ; L 3 
instrumental in (*.•. final alimony settJemeiv 1 Affidavit of. 
Di IM.- ^ • Add. -125 ; z.u; Diane also left !v marriage 
wii_ «. , w; finjree and a J .:.pnse to practice law v _ u was p.., a 
for ; *_- -Jack during' the marriage hose assets have decreased 
Di.«fi' "-rpenses and allowed hei to increase ho.r income. 
They weio niiujo] I n the package settlement una.: u::e par Lies 
achieved. 
Dia > • <•-;--\M-•!••> . :' ( '• ol divorce w~ro 
$1,729.00. ;•-.;•; ~> and 1< . i ,: . 1j • . nrs amount, 01 .2 .., 0 
w a s u s e d f o r a u t o e x p e n s e s and a u t o p a y m e n t c o m b i n e d . D i a n e ' s 
most: r^^-rnT . :->-: .•: •> :.-^o:-' L •  ;.. • -•-•-• " • : -..--*-
 r -...- ,,,,_s 
and auto expenses have risen i;o v'^ o-I pi:ir ;;ionLi.,
 ;ili .'.iicreaje oi 
$484 per month. (Add, -;!-,- •acreage is due primarily 
th. : n-r< • ' : 
$389 per mont : 1 •.• 1 an e>/pensi\ ^  vehicle ,w\,k, 
never enjoyed by r i tihei of: the parties during the marriage and. 
cannot t :- • • = u = ,
 ; ,
 ;
 < • = .n " ar d :: f I :ii ; :i 1 lg en j oyed 
during the marriage. (Add. ! ; uL.:ng tl le Marriage the 
parties did purchase a new !\W* Javelin f>> approximately •';.**. 400 
ai'A ' : ' • • • ! ; • i -.i:-: i ::*«-.U : 1 , 
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payments were never over $100 to $150 per month. (Add., 50, ^ 
24) The purchase of a vehicle for nearly $20,000 was not within 
the standard of living enjoyed by the parties. 
Diane argued below that this $20,000 vehicle was necessary 
to provide reliable transportation for her law practice, but this 
cannot be taken at face value. (R. 430, H 34) Certainly vehicles, 
even new vehicles, in a lower price range could have easily 
supplied this at less than half the monthly expense. Numerous 
attorneys drive new vehicles purchase for under $10,000. The 
cost of this new vehicle should be excluded from Diane's monthly 
expenses as not within the standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties. Excluding the increased expenses due to the new 
vehicle, Diane has monthly expenses of $1,73 7.00. 
Diane's income has more than compensated for the alimony 
payments. She is now able to provide for herself a standard of 
living which is equal to that enjoyed during the marriage of the 
parties. In 1993 she had gross monthly income, including child 
support, of $2,203.00. (Add. 2-3, H 2;R. 429, t 31) To July of 
1994, she has a gross monthly income, including child support, of 
$2,297.54. (Add. 2-3, H 2;R. 429, H 33) Her monthly expenses as 
set forth in her Financial Declaration of July 1994, and 
excluding the increase due to the new vehicle she purchased is 
$1,73 7.00. Her income leaves her nearly $500 above her 
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reasonable living expenses, which is more than sufficient to pay 
her taxes. There is no material issue of fact which disputes 
that Diane's income has more than compensated for the alimony she 
has been receiving from Jack and that she is now capable of 
providing for her own support. 
Diane disagreed below with the inclusion of child support as 
income in determining her need for alimony. However, her 
financial declaration includes all of the expenses for the minor 
child in the monthly expenses. (Plaintiff's Financial Declaration 
dated July 11, 1994 "Wife - Custodial Parent - 1 minor child 
included in expenses.", Add. 39) Since the expenses for the 
minor child are included in the monthly expenses listed for 
Diane, it is proper that her income should include child support 
which is intended to cover the child's care and expenses. 
Diane also objected below to the use of gross income instead 
of net after taxes. However, if a net after tax calculation is 
used, it must be adjusted for the tax benefit Diane will receive 
from a termination of alimony. Alimony is included as income to 
the payee spouse and as a deduction to the payor. (I.R.C. § 71 
and 215) Therefore, at a 15% bracket, Plaintiff will receive a 
federal tax benefit from the termination of alimony in the amount 
of $97.50 per month. Excluding the state tax benefits Diane will 
receive, Diane's after tax income would be $1,400.50 for 1993 and 
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$1,494.50 for 1994. (R. 522-523, (1,303 and 1,397 + 97.50)). 
Adding the monthly child support of $430 per month, Diane has 
after tax income of $1,830.50 for 1993 and $1,924.50 for 1994. 
This leaves $93.50 per month for 1993 and $187.50 per month for 
1994 over and above her reasonable expenses. With these amounts 
and the $100 remaining in the budget for a vehicle, Diane could 
obtain a vehicle in line with the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. 
Finally, Diane argued below that her budget stated in her 
financial declaration is a shoestring budget. However, a careful 
review of the budget displays that this is not the case. She has 
listed $350 per month for food and household supplies for two 
people, and $100 per month for entertainment, and $125 for 
incidentals. (Add. 39) She has also listed $159 per month for 
other expenses which includes an allowance of $64.50 for the 
minor child, upkeep of horses for $65.00 per month, and 
veterinary bills of $21.00. (Id.) There is undoubtedly ample 
room in Diane's budget. 
The court has the discretion to modify the support payment 
retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition for 
modification. 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any period 
during which a petition for modification is pending, but 
only from the date notice of that petition was given to the 
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obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the 
obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6. Such a retroactive modification to 
the date of filing the petition is appropriate here in light of 
the income Diane was indisputably making over the entire term of 
the proceedings in the lower court. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING DIANE'S 
ATTORNEY FEES BY FINDING JACK'S PETITION TO MODIFY 
FRIVOLOUS, UNMERITORIOUS, AND BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH 
The district court abused its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to Diane. The facts show that Diane's income has 
increased substantially since the divorce, increasing from $80 to 
more than $1,700 per month, a 21 fold increase. The petition to 
modify or terminate alimony was brought by Jack in good faith, 
believing that the increase in income was substantial for 
modification of alimony and based upon the advise of his 
attorneys. This belief was supported by the court commissioners 
recommendation that alimony be reduced. (R. 3 90) Accordingly, 
Jack's petition was not without merit or brought in bad faith, 
and attorneys fees should not have been awarded to Diane. 
31 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING JACK'S 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES BASED ON THE UNMERITORIOUS NATURE 
OF DIANE'S DEFENSE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, 
except under Subsection (2). 
Diane's defense of this case is without merit and not brought in 
good faith. In the analogous case of Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 
Supra, Mr. Jacobsen entered into a stipulated property settlement 
for divorce. In the stipulation, Mr. Jacobsen granted all the 
property accumulated during the marriage to Mrs. Jacobsen. Mr. 
Jacobsen later brought a lawsuit alleging that Mrs. Jacobsen had 
induced him to sign the property settlement agreement upon the 
express condition that she would reconvey to Mr. Jacobsen a one-
half interest in the real property that was the subject of the 
suit. As previously quoted, the trial court found the matter 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, granted summary judgment 
for Mrs. Jacobsen, and awarded attorneys fees against Mr. 
Jacobsen based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 holding that the 
action was not brought in good faith. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed. 
Similarly here, Diane argues a defense which is without 
merit, the majority of the issues being res judicata and 
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conclusively established. Further, Plaintiff has been able to 
litigate her position without restraint due to her position as an 
attorney and her ability to swap legal services with her counsel. 
Diane has had no actual out of pocket expenses for attorneys 
fees. (R. 537) Jack, on the other hand has incurred substantial 
amounts of attorney fees in this proceeding. Therefore, it is 
equitable that Jack be awarded his attorney fees incurred in 
pursuing this action below. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Jack respectfully requests this 
Court to: (1) reverse the Summary Judgment in Diane's favor; (2) 
reverse the award of attorney fees to Diane; (3) reverse the 
denial of Summary Judgment in Jack's favor and remand to the 
trial court for entry of Summary Judgment terminating alimony; 
and (4) and reverse the denial of Jack's attorney fees. In the 
alternative, Jack requests a direction of summary judgment on the 
issue of substantial change in circumstances with a remand for 
determination of the appropriate level of alimony, or a remand 
33 
for trial to resolve any ambiguity the court may find in the 
parties Stipulation. 
DATED this f day of June, 1995. 
feXVB. Skoubj 
Forney for^T)efendant/Appellant 
Jack Jones 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7 day of June, 1995, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be hand 
delivered to the following: 
John K. Rice 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee 
17 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 896 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * k i< k * * 
DIANE SHARON JONES, ) 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
Plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
JACK LLOYD JONES, ) Civil No. 914902425DA 
Defendant. ) Judge Homer Wilkinson 
* * * * * * * 
The parties in the above-entitled action appeared at a 
pre-trial conference before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on 
June 5, 1992. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented 
by Ronald E. Runs:. Defendant appeared in person and was 
represented by Nicolaas de Jonge. A stipulation was entered 
into by the parties at the pre-trial conference, which 
stipulation was recul into the record. However, the parties 
having discovered additional information which rendered those 
those provisions of the stipulation reletting to Defendant's 
retirement and deferred income plans impracticable and the 
parties having negotiated a new stipulation hereby agree to the 
following: 
1. The parties acknowledge and agree that each party is a 
fit parent to have custody of the minor child, Amber Michelle 
Jonesr and that joint cuslody of the child be awarded, with 
physical custody residing with the Plaintiff, as primary 
custodian, and with defendant designated as secondary 
custodian. It is further agreed that defendant be awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation with the parties1 minor child, 
which minimum rights of visitation shall be in accordance with 
the district court guidelines, a copy of which is attached 
heireto. 
Defendant's rights as a secondary custodian shall include 
the following: (i) the rjght to notice, consultation and input 
with respect to any extraordinary medical treatment, (i.e., any 
medical treatment other than routine examinations or treatment 
for minor illnesses); (ii) the right to notice, consultation 
and input v/ith respect to elective medical treatment; (iii) the 
right to consent to emergency medical treatment when the 
child is present with Defendant during visitation periods or if 
Plaintiff Ccinnot be reasonable and promptly contacted; (iv) 
direct access to school records and Lhe right to notice and 
participation in parent-teacher consultations; (v) direct 
access to medical records; (vi) right to consultation and input 
with respect to any special needs of the child. 
2. The Defendant earns a gross monthly income in the sum 
of $4,300.00 per month and the plaintiff earns a gross monthly 
income of $80.00 per month. Based on the respective parties1 
income, the parties stipulate and agree that the defendant 
shall pay $430.00 per month as child support which amount is in 
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines currently 
o n t\ r. 
in use by the Court. The Defendant's obligation to pay child 
support for and on behalf of the parties1 minor child shall 
terminate when said child attains the age of eighteen (18) or 
she is otherwise emancipated. The Decree of Divorce shall 
contain an order authorizing mandatory withholding for support 
in the event defendant is in arreeirs cit least thirty (30) days 
with his obligation to pay child support. 
3. Defendant presently has ^wail^lble through his place of 
employment full and comprehensive medical and dental insurance 
for the benefit of the parties' minor child. It is stipulated 
and agreed between the parties that the defendant will continue 
to carry medial and dental insurance for the benefit of the 
parties' minor child, as long as such insurance is available to 
him through his place of employment. It is further agreed that 
all routine medical and dental expenses not covered by 
insurance shall be paid for by Plaintiff. All non-routine 
medical and dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the 
parties' minor child shall be shared equally by the parties. 
It is further agreed and understood by the parties that the 
diabetic care and treatment received by the minor child, Amber 
Michelle Jones, slmll not be considered routine medical 
expenses and both parties agree to share equally in the expense 
incurred Cor such treatment and care. It is agreed that 
plaintiff will provide to the defendant copies of billings of 
all non-routine medical and dental expenses incurred for the 
benefit of the parties' minor child, and the defendant agrees 
to pay direct to medical providers, within thirty days of 
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receipt thereof his one-half share thereof. It is further 
agreed that plaintiff sha] 1 provide medical and dental 
insurance for the minor child at such lime as such insurance 
becomes available to her at a reasonable cost. Defendant 
should be ordered to provide plaintiff, upon receipt, copies of 
medical and dental insurance benefit statements. 
4. The college fund currently held under the Uniform Gift 
to Minors Act for the bencfil oJ the minor child with the 
plaintiff acting as sole custodian shall be split equally 
between the parties. Defendant will act as custodian and be 
required to invest one half (1/2) as he chooses under the 
provisions of the Uniform Gift to Minor's Act. 
5. The parties stipulate and agree that except as 
otherwise specified herein, the personal property should be 
awarded as the parties have herelofore divided it. It is 
further agreed that the disparity in the division of personal 
property in favor of the plaintiff is offset by Defendant's 
receipt of Six Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($6,300.00) 
through the sale of PacifiCorp common stock in June, 1991. 
6. It is stipulated and agreed that the residence located 
at 9717 South 1600 West, South Jordan, Utah be awarded to the 
Plaintiff, as her sole and separate property, subject to the 
mortgage liability thereon, which plaintiff should be ordered 
to pay and dischaige on a current basis and to hold defendant 
harmless therefrom. If is further agreed that the defendant 
will quit-claim all of his right, title and interest to 
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plaintiff within ten dcays after entry of the decree of divorce 
herein, 
7. The parties stipulate and agree that the unimproved 
real property consisting of 2.48 acres located at approximately 
9775 South 1550 West, South Jordan, Utah be sold forthwith, and 
that the net sale proceeds be awarded to the Defendant as his 
sole and separate property. It is further agreed that the 
defendant will be responsible to pay and discharge any and all 
income taxes which may be incurred as a result of the sale, 
costs of said sale, and 1991 property taxes accrued to the date 
of sale. It is further agreed that plaintiff will provide to 
defendant all records and documentation in her possession 
evidencing the original purchase price of subject property and 
monies spent for capital improvements thereon. 
8. The parties stipulate and agree that the real property 
located east of Colorado Springs, consisting of 46.89 acres, 
should be awarded to Defendant as his sole and separate 
property, subject to a Two Thousand Dollar ($2,000.00) 
equitable lien awarded to Plaintiff. It is further agreed 
between the parties that the lien awarded plaintiff shall be 
payable upon the sale of subject property or upon the minor 
child reaching the age of eighteen years, whichever event 
occurs first. Said lien shall not accrue interest. It is 
further agreed that Plaintiff will quit claim said property to 
Defendant within ten days from the date of entry of a decree of 
divorce herein. 
a 
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9. During the marriage the defendant accumulated certain 
retirement benefits through his present employer, PacifiCorp. 
It is stipulated and agreed that the plaintiff should be 
awarded a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in 
Defendant's retirement account through PacifiCorp. It is 
further agreed that plaintiff's interest in defendant's 
retirement account is limited to her equal share of retirement 
benefits accrued to the defendant through the date of entry of 
the decree of divorce herein. 
10. The parties stipulate and agree that the defendant pay 
to Plaintiff the sum of Nine Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty 
Dollars ($9,250.00) as her agreed upon share of the PacifiCorp 
common stock acquired during the parties' marriage. It is 
further agreed that defendant will pay said amount to plaintiff 
from the proceeds of the sale of the land at 9775 South 1550 
West, South Jordan, Utah. Plaintiff is responsible for any 
taxes and penalties incurred for the sale of Seven Thousand 
Dollars ($7,000.00) of PacifiCorp common stock through a 
hardship withdrawal. Defendant will cooperate in providing the 
necessary documentation for determineifion of Plaintiff's tax 
liability on the stock sale for the filing of her 1992 Federal 
and State tcix returns. 
11. The parties stipulate and agree that the Defendant pay 
to Plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in 
lieu of any interest she may have in the Deferred Compensation 
Plan available to Defendant through his present place of 
employment. Upon the payment by defendant to plaintiff, 
plaintiff irrevocably waives any rightf title and interest she 
may otherwise have had in defendant's Deferred Compensation 
Plan, The patrtL.es further agree that the $5,000.00 payable by 
the defendant to the plaintiff hereunder shall be paid from the 
net proceeds from the sale of the unimproved land at 9775 South 
1550 West, South Jordan, Utah. 
12. The parties stipulate and agree that plaintiff's 
present gross monthly income is $80.00 and that defendant's 
gross monthly income from his employment is $4,300.00. Based 
upon the respective parties' income as set forth herein, it is 
stipulated and agreed that the defendant will pay to the 
plaintiff, alimony in the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars 
($800.00) per month. It is further agreed, however, that at 
such time as Defendant has paid to Plaintiff the sums 
immediately due and owing to her under the terms of this 
agreement, a total amount of Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and 
Fifty Dollars, (14,250.00), alimony shall be immediately 
reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and Filty Dollars ($650.00) 
per month. It is further agreed that defendant's obi igeition to 
pay a] imony to the defendant shall terminate; within five years 
from date of enLry of zi decree of divorce herein, or at such 
time as the Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's 
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for her own 
support. 
It is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of 
determining defendant's continued obligation to pay alimony to 
plaintiff, plaintiff will provide to defendant at his request, 
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through her counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintifffs 
business records and tax returns, for purposes of determining 
plaintiff's continued need to receive alimony from the 
defendant. Tt is further agreed that defendant shall be 
entitled to receive such financial information from the 
plaintiff every six months, and such information shall be 
provided by plaintiff to the defendant within thirty days after 
receiving written request therefore. Tt is agreed that the 
defendant may petition the Court, by way of a Motion, for a 
reduction in alimony pciyments rind an adjustment of chiid 
support based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from time to 
t i me. 
13. It is stipulated and agreed that each of the peirties 
hereto will pay and discharge their respective costs and 
attorneys' fee incurred herein. 
14. It is stipulated and agreed that each of the parties 
hereto will pay their respective debts and obligations incurred 
since the parties' separation on M£iy 17, 1991 and each eigrees 
to hold the other harmless for any liability therefrom. 
15. It is stipulated and agreed that the defendant shall 
obtain and maintain life insurance on his life in the minimum 
amount of $50,000.00, naming the minor child, Amber M. Jones as 
the beneficiary of such policy. Defendant is free to name a 
trustee of his choice should those benefits become payable. 
Defendant shall provide annual proof that such a policy is 
being maintained for the benefit of the minor child. Said 
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policy should remain in effect until the child attains the age 
of 18 years, 
16a It is stipulated and agreed that each of the parties 
agrees to cooperate with the other, through their respective 
counsel, to effect changes in titles to property agreed to be 
divided hereunder and to insure that the Stipulation entered 
into is carried out in every detail. 
17. The parties stipulate and agree that this Stipulation 
is a complete settlement of all rights either party may have in 
the other's property, whether presently existing or hereafter 
acquired. > 
DATED this _/ day of September, 1992. 
n 
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Diane S.Jpn<$s 
P l a i n t i f f (' ' 
Oa** 
Jcxck L. J o n e s 
/ESefendcint 
^ ^ - ^ 
^ 
vitt^ u 
Ronald E. Kunz 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l c i i n t i f f 
' / 
^Nicolaa'&•>'de" Joft ge' *\. 
( -A t to rney" f o r J2iH:endant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Diane S. Jones, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and states that she is the plaintiff in the within matter, that 
she has read the foregoing, knows the contents thereof, that 
the same are true to the best of her knowledge except those 
matters based on belief, cind as to those matters she believes 
a a i\ 
them to be true. 
., „ J ^ Qsi r .„, 
Diane S. Jonps 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me Lhis _/ day of 
September, 1992. 
\ »~ C<k 
•MQTAIIY DUDLT-e 
STATE OF UTAH 
LCSUHA.D2JO;:G2 
msamjC'SasEdusH 
4212 HIGHl AND DRIVE 
SALTLAKEC(TY.UT84124 
C0MM.EXP.10-1CO4 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jack L. Jones, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
states that he is the defendant in the within matter, that he 
has read the foregoing, knows the contents thereof, that the 
same are true to the best of his knowledge except those matters 
based on belief, and as to those matters he believes them to be 
true. 
JricflcL. Jones y 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / day of 
September, 1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC " 7 Z S r 
LGSLIEA.D2J0;:G2 
fOTJIBlfPUBlC'SRIFdUEW 
4212 HIGH1AND DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CnY.UT 84124 
COMM.EXP.10-1G-04 
0 0 ?, i 4 (\ 
v,'*^WH?KTTSSOT 
r>y..;>-!«!•> J ••• 
NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0859) 
Attorney for Defenclcint 
4212 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: 27 2-10]3 
B/ 
SEP 2 3 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
DIANE SHARON JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK LLOYD JONES, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 914902425DA 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
* * * * * * * 
The parties in the above-entitled action appeared at a 
pre-trial settlement conference before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson on June 5, 1992. Plaintiff appeared in person and 
was represented by her counsel, Ronald E. Kunz. Defendant 
appeared in person and was represented by his counsel, Nicolaas 
de Jonge. A stipulation was entered into by the parties at the 
pre-trial conference, which stipulation was read into the 
record. However, the parties having discovered additional 
information which rendered certain provisions of the 
stipulation relating to Defendant's retirement and deferred 
income plans impracticable, the parties negotiated a new 
stipulation which was duly signed and executed by the parties 
and their respective counsel, the original of which has been 
filed with the Court. This Court having reviewed the 
stipulation, and the dei'endanL having withdrawn his ansv/er and 
counterclaim on file herein, therefore his default v/as entered. 
Based upon the testimony of the plaintiff, and based upon the 
records, files and pleadings filed herein, and good cause 
appearing therefore, the Court now hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
3. That plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and was so for more that throe months prior to the 
filing of the complaint in thjs matter. 
2. That the parties have encountered differences during 
their marriage which cannot be reconciled, making continuation 
of the marriage impossible. 
3. That each party is a fit parent to have custody of the 
minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, and that joint custody of 
the child be awarded, with physical custody residing with the 
Plaintiff, as primary custodian, and with defendant designated 
as secondary custodian. That defendant be awarded reasonable 
rights of visitation with the parties1 minor child, which 
minimum rights of visitation shall be in accordance with the 
district court guidelines, a copy of which is attached hereto. 
That Defendant's rights as a secondary custodian shall 
include the following: (i) the right to notice, consultation 
and input with respect to any extraordinary medical treatment, 
(i.e., any medical treatment other than routine examinations or 
treatment for minor illnesses); (ii) the right to notice, 
consultation and input with respect to elective medical 
treatment; (iii) the right to consent to emergency medical 
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treatment when the child is present with Defendant during 
visitation periods or if Plaintiff cannot be reasonable and 
promptly contacted; (iv) direct access to school records and 
the right to notice and participation in parent-teacher 
consultations; (v) direct access to medical records; (vi) right 
to consultation and input with respect to any special needs of 
the child. 
4. That Defendant earns a gross monthly income in the sum 
of $4,300.00 per month and that plaintiff earns a gross monthly 
income of $80.00 per month. Based on the respective parties1 
income, the Court finds that the defendant should be ordered to 
pay $430.00 per month as child support which amount is in 
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines currently 
in use by the Court. That Defendant's obligation to pay child 
support for and on behalf of the parties1 minor child should 
terminate when said child attains the age of eighteen (18) or 
she is otherwise emancipated. That plaintiff should be 
entitled to an order authorizing mandatory withholding for 
support in the event defendant is in arrears at least thirty 
(30) days with his obligation to pay child support. 
5. That Defendant presently has avai leible through his 
place of employment full and comprehensive medical and dental 
insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor child. The 
Court finds that the defendant should bo ordered to continue to 
carry medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the 
parties1 minor child, as long as such insurance is available to 
him through his place of employment. The Court further finds 
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that all routine medical and denial expenses not covered by 
insurance should be ordered paid for by Plaintiff, and that all 
non-routine medical and denial expenses incurred for the 
benefit of Lhe parties1 minor cluld should be shared equally by 
the parties. That the diaboMc care and treatment received by 
the minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, will not be considered 
routine medical expenses and each of the parties should be 
ordered Lo share equally in the expense incurred for such 
treatment and care. That plaintiff will provide to the 
defendant copies of billings of call non-routine medical and 
dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties1 minor 
child, and the defendant should be ordered to pay direct to 
medical providers, within thirty davs after receipt thereof, 
his one-half share thereof. That plaintiff should be ordered 
to provide medical and dental insurance for the minor child at 
such time as such insurance becomes available to her at a 
reasonable cost. That Defendant should be ordered to provide 
to plaintiff, upon receipt, copies of medical and dental 
insurance benefit statements. 
6. That the college fund currently held under the Uniform 
Gift to Minors Act for the benefiI of the minor child with the 
plaintiff acting as sole custodian should be split equally 
between the parties. That Defendant will act as custodian and 
be required to invest one halt (1/2) as he chooses under the 
provisions of the Uniform Gift to Minor's Act. 
7. That except as otherwise stated herein, the personal 
property should be awarded as the parties have heretofore 
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divided it. That the disparity in the division of personal 
property in favor of the plaintiff is offset by Defendant's 
receipt of Six Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($6,300.00) 
through the sale of PacifiCorp common stock in June, 1991. 
8. That the residence located at 9717 South 1600 West, 
South Jordan, Utah should be £iwarded to the Plaintiff, as her 
sole and separate property, subject to the mortgage liability 
thereon, which plaintiff should be ordered to pay and discharge 
on a current basis and to hold defendant harmless therefrom. 
That the defendant should be ordered to quit-claim all of his 
right, title and interest in subject property to plaintiff 
within ten days difter entry of the decree of divorce herein. 
9. That the unimproved real property consisting of 2.4 8 
acres located at approximately 9775 South 1550 West, South 
Jordan, Utah should be sold forthwith, and that the net sale 
proceeds be awarded to the Defendant cis his sole and separate 
property. That the defendant be ordered to pay and discharge 
any and all income taxes which may be incurred as a result of 
the sale, costs of said sale, and J 991 property taxes accrued 
to the date of sale. Furthermore, that plaintiff should be 
ordered to provide to defendant all records and documentation 
in her possession evidencing the original purchase price of 
subject property and moni.es spent for capital improvements 
thereon. 
10. That the real property located east of Colorado 
Springs, consisting of 46.89 acres, should be awarded to 
Defendant as his sole and separate property, subject to a Two 
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Thousand Dollar ($2,000.00) equitable lien awarded to 
Plaintiff. That the lien awarded plaintiff should be payable 
upon the sale of subject property or upon the minor child 
reaching the age of eighteen years, whichever event occurs 
first. Said lien shall not accrue interest. That Plaintiff 
should be ordered to quit claim said property to Defendant 
within ten days from the date of entry of a decree of divorce 
herein. 
11. That during the marriciqe the defendant accumulated 
certain retirement benefits through his present employer, 
PacifiCorp. That the plaintiff should be awarded a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in Defendant's retirement 
account through PacifiCorp. Furthermore, that plaintiff's 
interest in defendant's retirement account should be limited to 
her equal share of retirement bene Cits accrued to the defendant 
through the date of entry of the decree of divorce herein. 
12. That the defendant should be ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff the sum of Nine Thous£tnd Two Hundred and Fifty 
Dollars ($9,250.00) as her share of the PacifiCorp common stock 
acquired during the parties' marriage. That defendant should 
be ordered to pay said amount to plaintiff from the proceeds of 
the sale of the land at 9775 South L550 West, South Jordan, 
Utah. That Plaintiff be responsible for any taxes and 
penalties incurred for the sale of Seven Thousand Dollars 
($7,000.00) of PacifiCorp common stock through a hardship 
withdrawal. Furthermore, that Defendant should be ordered to 
cooperate in providing the necessary documentation for 
o o o 1!';.;; 
G 
determining Plaintiff's tax liability on the stock sale for the 
filing of her 1992 Federal and State tax returns. 
13. That the Defendant should be ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in lieu 
of any interest she may have in the Deferred Compensation Plan 
available to Defendant through his present place of employment. 
That upon payment by defendant to plaintiff, plaintiff shall 
thereafter irrevocably waive any right, title and interest she 
may otherwise have had in defendant's Deferred Compensation 
Plan. 
Furthermore, that the $5,000.00 payable by the defendant 
to the plaintiff hereunder shall be paid from the net proceeds 
from the sale of the unimproved land at 9775 South 1550 West, 
South Jordan, Utah. 
14. That plaintiff's present gross monthly income is 
$80.00 and that defendant's gross monthly income from his 
employment is $4,300.00. That based upon the respective 
parties' income as set forth herein, defendant should be 
ordered to pay to the plaintiff, alimony in the sum of Eight 
Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month. That at such time as 
Defendant has paid to Plaintiff the sums immediately due and 
owing to her as provided herein, a total amount of Fourteen 
Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars, (14,250.00), alimony 
should be immediately reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and 
Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per month. That defendant's obligation 
to pay alimony to the defendant should terminate within five 
years from the entry of a decree of divorce herein, or at such 
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time as the Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's 
circumstances and plajntill's ability to provide for her own 
support. 
Ttuit for purposes of determining defendant's continued 
obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff, plaintiff should be 
ordered to provide to defendant, at his request, through 
Plaintiff's counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintiff's 
business records and tax returns, for purposes of determining 
plaintiff's continued need to receive alimony from the 
defendant. That defendant should be allowed to receive such 
financial information from the plaintiff every six months, and 
such information shall be provided by plaintiff to the 
defendant within thirty days after receiving written request 
therefore. That the defendant may petition the Court, by way 
of a Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an 
adjustment of child support based on changes in the Plaintiff's 
income from time to time. 
15. That each of the parties should be ordered to pay and 
discharge their respective costs and attorneys' fees incurred 
herein. 
16. That each of the parties should be ordered to pay 
their respective debts and obligations incurred since the 
parties' separation on May 11, 1991 and each should be ordered 
to hold the other harmless for any liability therefrom. 
17. That the defendant should be ordered to obtain and 
maintain life insurance on his life with a minimum face value 
of $50,000.00, naming the minor child, Amber M. Jones as the 
beneficiary of such policy, if available through his place of 
employment. That Defendant is free to name a trustee of his 
choice should those benefits become payable. Defendant shall 
provide annual proof that such a policy is being maintained for 
the benefit of the minor child. That said policy should remain 
in effect until the child attains the age of 18 years. 
18. That each of the parties agrees to cooperate with the 
other, through their respective counsel, to effect changes in 
titles to property ordered to be divided hereunder and to 
insure that the Order entered herein is carried out in every 
detai1. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff be awcirded a Decree of Divorce, the 
same to become final upon entry. 
2. That the decree of divoice be entered in accordance 
with the Findings oC Fact contained herein. 
DATED this day of Sopbomber, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved bo form 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
M \\ o i r-. r. 
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NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0 359) 
Attorney for Defendant /'6-i-
4 212 Highland Drive "'- oopjiyoio," 
Salt Lake City, Utali 843 24 
Telephone: 272-1013 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
DIANE SHARON JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK LLOYD JONES, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 914902425DA 
0 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
* * * * * * * 
The above-entitled came duly before the above-entitled 
Court on the 5th day of June, 19 92, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, Ronald E. Kunz. Defendant appeared 
in person and was represented by his counsel, Nicolaas de 
Jonge. A stipulation was entered into by the parties at the 
pre-trial conference, which stipulation was read into the 
record. However, the parties having discovered additional 
information which rendered certain provisions of the 
stipulation relating to Defendant's retirement and deferred 
income plans impracticable, the parties negotiated a new 
stipulation which was duly signed and executed by the parties 
and their respective counsel, the original of which has been 
filed with the Court. This Court having reviewed the 
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stipulation, and based upon the testimony of the plaintiff, and 
upon the records, files and pleadings filed herein, and good 
cause appearing therefore, the Court having heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact cind Conclusions of Law, now 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff herein is awarded a decree of divorce, 
the same to become final upon entry. 
2. Each party is a fit parent to have custody of the 
minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, and joint custody of the 
child is hereby awarded, with physical custody, however, 
residing with the Pl^iintiff, as primary custodian, and with 
defendant designated as secondary custodian. Defendant is 
awarded reasonable rights of visitation with the parties1 minor 
child, which minimum rights of visitation shall be in 
accordcince with the district court guidelines, a copy of which 
is attached hereto. 
Defendants rights as a secondary custodian shall include 
the following: (i) the right to notice, consultation and input 
with respect to any extraordinary medical treatment, (i.e., any 
medical treatment other than routine examinations or treatment 
for minor illnesses); (ii) the right to notice, consultation 
and input with respect to elective medical treatment; (iii) the 
right to consent to emergency medical treatment when the child 
is present with Defendant during visitation periods or if 
Plaintiff cannot be reasonable and promptly contacted; (iv) 
direct access to school records and the right to notice and 
participation in parent-te^icher consultations; (v) direct 
access to medical records; (vi) right to consultation and input 
with respect to any special needs of the child. 
3. Defendant is ordered to pay $430.00 per month. 
Defendant's obligation to pay child support for and on behalf 
of the parties1 minor child shall terminate when said child 
attains the age of eighteen (18) or she is otherwise 
emancipated. Plaintiff is hereby granted an order authorizing 
mandatory withholding for support in the event defendant 
becomes in arrears at lecist thirty (30) days with his 
obligation to pay child support. 
4. Defendant is ordered to continue to maintain medical 
and dental insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor 
child, as long as such insurance is available to him through 
his place of employment. All routine medical and dental 
expenses not covered by insurance are ordered to be paid by 
Plaintiff. All non-routine medical and dental expenses 
incurred for the benefit of the parties1 minor child shall be 
shared equally by the parties. The diabetic care and treatment 
received by the minor child, Amber Michelle Jones, are not to 
be considered routine medical expenses and each of the parties 
is ordered to share equally in the expense incurred for such 
treatment and care. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to the 
defendant copies of billings of all non-routine medical and 
dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor 
child, and the defendant is ordered to pay direct to medical 
providers, within thirty days after receipt thereof, his 
one-half share thereof. Plaintiff is ordered to provide 
medical and dental insurance for the minor child at such time 
as such insurance becomes available to her at a reasonable 
cost. Defendant is ordered to provide to plaintiff, upon 
receipt, copies of medical and dental insurance benefit 
statements. 
5. The college fund currently held under the Uniform Gift 
to Minors Act for the benefit of the minor child, with the 
plaintiff acting as sole custodian, should be split equally 
between the parties. Defendant will act as custodian and be 
required to invest one half (1/2) as he chooses under the 
provisions of the Uniform Gift to Minor's Act. 
6. That except as otherwise ordered herein, the personal 
property is awarded as the parties have heretofore divided it. 
7. The residence located at 9717 South 1600 West, South 
Jordan, Utah is awarded to the Plaintiff, as her sole and 
separate property, subject to the mortgage liability thereon, 
which plaintiff is ordered to pay and discharge on a current 
basis and to hold defendant harmless therefrom. Defendant is 
ordered to quit-claim all of his right, title and interest in 
subject property to plaintiff within ten days after entry of 
the decree of divorce herein. 
8. The unimproved real property consisting of 2.4 8 acres 
located at approximately 9775 South 1550 West, South Jordan, 
Utah is ordered to be sold forthwith, and the net sale proceeds 
are awarded to the Defendant as his sole and separate property. 
The defendant is ordered to pay and discharge any and all 
income taxes which may be incurred as a result of the sale, 
costs of said sale, and 1991 property taxes accrued to the date 
of sale. Furthermore, plaintiff is ordered to provide to 
defendant all records and documentation in her possession 
evidencing the original purchase price of subject property and 
monies spent for capital improvements thereon. 
9. The real property located east of Colorado Springs, 
consisting of 46.89 acres, is awarded to Defendant as his sole 
and separate property, subject to a Two Thousand Dollar 
($2,000.00) equitable lien hereby awarded to Plaintiff. The 
lien awarded plaintiff is p£iyeible upon the sale of subject 
property or upon the minor child reaching the age of eighteen 
years, whichever event occurs first. Said lien shall not 
accrue interest. Plaintiff should be ordered to quit claim 
said property to Defendant within ten days from the date of 
entry of a decree of divorce herein. 
10. That plaintiff is awarded a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order (QDRO) in Defendant's retirement account 
through PacifiCorp. Plciintifffs interest in defendant's 
retirement account is limited, however, to her equal share of 
retirement benefits accrued to the defendant through the date 
of entry of the decree of divorce herein. 
11. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the 
sum of Nine Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($9,250.00) 
as her share of the PacifiCorp common stock acquired during the 
parties1 marriage. Defendant is further ordered to pay said 
amount to plaintiff from the proceeds of the sale of the land 
at 9775 South 1550 West, South Jordan, Utah. Plaintiff is 
*l \x s r. 
ordered to pay any taxes and penalties incurred for the sale of 
Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) of PacifiCorp common stock 
through a hardship withdrawal. Defendcint is ordered to 
cooperate in pi~oviding the necessary documentation for 
determining Plaintiff's tax liability on the stock sale for the 
filing of her 1992 Federal and State tax returns. 
12. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in lieu of any interest she 
may have in the Deferred Compensation Plan available to 
Defendant through his present place of employment. Upon 
payment by defendant to plaintiff, plaintiff thereafter 
irrevocably waives any right, title and interest she may 
otherwise have had in defendant's Deferred Compensation Plan. 
Furthermore, the $5,000.00 payable by the defendant to the 
plaintiff hereunder is ordered to be paid from the net proceeds 
from the sale of the unimproved land at 9775 South 1550 West, 
South Jordan, Utah. 
13. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, alimony 
in the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month. At 
such time as Defendant has paid to Pl£iintiff the lump sums 
immediately due and owing to her as provided herein, which sums 
total Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars, 
(14,250.00), alimony shall, without further order of the 
Court, be immediately reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and 
Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per month. Defendant's obligation to 
pay alimony to the defendant shall terminate within five years 
from the entry of a decree of divorce herein, or at such time 
*t U a 1 i'' \ 
as the Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's 
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for her own 
support. 
For purposes of determining defendant's continued 
obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff, plaintiff is ordered to 
provi.de to defendant, at his request, through Plaintiff's 
counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintiff's business records 
and tax returns, for purposes of determining plaintiff's 
continued need to receive alimony from the defendant. 
Defendant is allowed to request and receive such financial 
information from the plaintiff every six months, and such 
information shall be provided by plaintiff to the defendant 
within thirty days after receiving written request therefore. 
Defendant may petition the Court, by v/ay of a Motion, for a 
reduction in alimony payments and an adjustment of child 
support based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from time to 
time. 
14. Each of the parties is ordered to pay and discharge 
their respective costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein. 
15. Each of the parties is ordered to pay their respective 
debts and obligations incurred since the parties' separation on 
May 17, 1991 and each is ordered to hold the other harmless for 
any liability therefrom. 
16. Defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain life 
insurance on his life, if available through his employment, 
with a minimum face value of $50,000.00, naming the minor 
child, Amber M. Jones as the beneficiary of such policy. 
!! o ft i v ;: 
Defendant is free to name a trustee of his choice should those 
benefits become payable. Defendant is ordered to provide 
annual proof that such a policy is being maintained for the 
benefit of the minor child. Said policy should remain in 
effect until the child attains the age of 18 years, 
17. Each of the parties agrees to cooperate with the 
other, through their respective counsel, to effect changes in 
titles to property ordered to be divided hereunder and to 
insure that the Order entered herein is carried out in every 
detail. 
DATED this 23 day of September, 199 2, 
BY THE COURT 
Approved to form 
Rami Id Kunz 
/-f^ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
? ( i *~? 
<) 
1 i\ i\ & * j? •: 
Cf they are t able to agree, reasonable visitation l 11 routinely be 
defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten) children as follows: 
2 
3 
Alternate 
Weekends: 
Midweek: 
Holidays: 
Friday 6 p.m. Sunday 6 p.m. 
alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
(A) Christmas - nonr-custodial parent to have 
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and 
continuing through 1/2 of the child's total 
Christmas school vacation. 
(B) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent 
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1990, 92, 
94, etc.); Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 
6 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m. Non-custodial 
parent to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 
95, etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. 
until Sunday 6 p.m. 
(C) Other holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther 
King Day, Presidents' Day, Memorial Day, July 
4th, July 24th, and Labor Day. These are to 
be alternated, with the non-custodial parent 
to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation 
and no changes should be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule. 
Fathers' Day-
Mothers' Day: 
Birthdays: 
Extended-
Visitation: 
as appropriate, 6 p.m. 
the day of. 
the day before until 6 p.m. 
7, 
8 
Telephone: 
one evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the 
week of the child's birthday and the non-custodial 
parent's birthday. 
(A) Summer - 4 weeks continuous, with written notice 
of dates provided to custodial parent by May 
1st. Custodial parent to have alternate 
weekends, holiday, and phone visitation. 
(B) Year-Round school - two 2 week periods, with 
written notice of dates to custodial parent at 
least 30 days prior to visitation. Custodial 
parent to have holiday, and phone visitation. 
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year 
uninterrupted possession of the children for 
purposes of vacation, provided the same does not 
interfere with holiday visitation per above. 
Each parent shall notify the other in writing of 
such two week period at least 3 0 days in advance, 
reasonable, before 8 p.m. 
Other times as agreed, o o o i (-
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt LaKe County 
STATE OF UTAH ,, 
Case No.cg4.90.2475 ,
 f ~>W^y 
Financial Declaration 
-MANE-SIIAftQN-nJONES-
Plamtill 
vs. 
•QYEUIQt 
DCICMKLUII 
Husband: J a c k Llxxy-d-Jones-. 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. No.. 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Buihda te . 
Daled. F e b . 4 , 1992 
Wile: M a n e Sharon J o n e s 
Addiess: j_7_LZ__^o . 1 6XIQ_HL 
_So.__Jorjian, Utah_84Q6.5_ 
Soc Sec No 5 2 8 - 7 8 - ] 9 ? 3 
Occupation. A t t o r n e y 
S e l f Employer:. 
I3n Ihdatc: Z^/iZf^^-l-
NOTE: THIS DECORATION MUST HE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITIIER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILETI IIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
AUTI IORIZETI IE COURT TO ACCE1TT1 IE STATEMENT OFTI IE OTI IER PARTY ASTI IE BASIS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR 
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and de-
duct ions are made weekly, multiply by 4 .3; if figures arcpn a bi-weekly 
basis, multiply by 2.167) 
1 Gioss monthly income hoin 
Salary and wages, including < ommissions. bonuses 
allowances and oveitime. payable (pav 
penocl) 
Pensions and letnement _ 
Soc ud sec unlv 
Disability and unemployment insuiance 
Public assistanc e (wellaie. Al DC payments < Ic ) 
Child suppoi t fioin any pi lor man lage 
Dividends ,\\u\ interest 
Kents 
Aiiothei sou.ces (s,>cc,K)„ Horse b o a r d i n g 
S_ee_.attached . s c h e d u l e f o r income 
explanation. - - -
lOlAL MONIIILY INC OMK 
2 Iteuu/e monthly deduc tions horn gioss mc oinc 
State and fedeial income (axes _ 
Numbei ol exemptions taken 
Soc lal sec unly __ __ 
Medical oi other insmanc e (desc i ibe hilly) 
Union or othc i clues _ 
\<t hiement oi pension hind 
| J IUSHAND 
$ 
$ 
r 
wu i«: 
i 
o 
_LQ(L_Qfl_ 
$ 
J 
Other (specify) 
IOIAL MONIHLY DLDUCUONS 
3 Net monthly income take home pay 
$ 
$ 
$ 
* 100 .00 
4. Debts and obligations 
Cieditors Name Tor Date Payable Balance Monthly Payment 
-Vailay—Mortgage Co-, Home-
-U-rS-Bank Home-
-5 th /man t 
-5th/Tnonrth-
-^257-000-i -$388.00— 
—290-rOO— 
Holy Cros s Ho&p. Ho.sp-.biJ JOthJ-xaoxi-th- -450- -5CL-CLQ-
J jb . David-Jteck-
I O I A L 
-Eurgory- $ -250- $ -20^00— 
(II Instil fk k nt space insei t total and at lac h st he clulc) 
5 All piopeilyol the parties known to mc owiu d individually oi jointly (indicate who holds oi how title held (11) I lusband (W) Wile 
(J) Jointly) 
WIILRC SPACE IS INSUPI ICILNl I OR COMPl I IL INI OKMAIION OR I IS UNO PLLASL AHACII SLPARAIL SCIILDULL 
Value Owed lheieon 
(a) Household lutmshings luiuituie 
apphanies and cqiupnient CW) 
(b) Automobile (Year Make) 
.L98Q_Euick_CfinLury_iW^). 
1SO&. Ford Truck-QQ 
-3800-r-OO— 
J0DJ3a. 
_8i)Q.OO. 
-0-
(c) Sec unties stocks bonds 
-12J2 -Shaq ra s -Pac i f - i co rp Stock--(H) -30^0-00-+. 
(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks savings tk loans, 
credit unions savings and checking) 
-Kemper—Inves Lments Uniform. Gi£t__To i l i n o r i i (W). 
-Valley-Bank-&TrufiL Uniform G i f t - T o Minors(W) 
-Draper -Bank- & - T r u s t - (W. ) 
3200 
—700-
-1-000-
(e) Life Insuianc e 
Name of Company Policy No I a( c Amount 
( ash value. a< c umulalcd 
dividend, oi loan amount 
-S fea-t e - T a r n r r r f e (H)~ ~3 0 6 81"5 7" Unknown 
-SLatfe-Earm Life—(W) -5077564. 
-Co.Life-lna (LI) - ? 
(i) Piofit sharing or Krt ircmri i t At counts 
N
'
WK
' J a e k - L , — J o n G S - — . 
Unknown. 
-24-,-QOO 
~~Io7ooo- — 
J 50, 000 J -
Value of inti re st and amount prcsc nlly vc sh d 
— 15, 000- + currently—vest-ed 
Name
 Jaek-I^—Jones (deferred income plan)-(H)-50,-000-+ 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (spec ily) 
n it n /\ c i*\ 
Husband's ( ) Wife's K ) 
Proposed Settlement of Pending 
Divorce Litigation 
Child Suppoit $ Total (pci inoiilh) $ - 4 3 0 . - 0 0 
Alimony. For 12 months, r ev iewable 'total (pei month) $ 1070.00 
in one year 
Piopci (y Dish lhuhon: 
I P l a i n t l £ f r e c e i v e s tho—r^sidanc^Q—for—hei^sel-f—and~-the—miner—eh-irl-d— 
Defendant to r e t a i n h i s e q u i t y u n t i l the c h i l d turn 18 years of 
a^e, p l a i n t i f f r e m a r r i e s , or c o - h a b i t a t o s . 
2 . P l a i n t i f f to retain^O;h^^propGi^t-y---^t^-7-7-5-So-—1500—Vk 
The p r o p e r t y i s used by the minor c h i l d and has a r i rl 1 ng^anarm-
and barn which p l a i n t i f f wants to keep for the minor c h i l d . 
3_—Tn exchange—fxxxi--daXendan4^&~aqu4-ty-—in—bive—2—1-/2 a c r e preper^ty— 
p l a i n t i f f w i l l su r r ende r her i n t c x g ^ L i n defendants defer red 
income p lan which i s c u r r e n t l y valued a t over $50,000.00 
4, Plalnt-iff wi-14—r-e-tain--her—eur-rent—interest—in-&&fendan^s—r^feg 
and receive a QDRQ. 
5-,—The reaJ—property in Colorado wil4^ -b^ --r^ a^J^ nQ4--by both—partis 
until it can be profitably sold, proceeds to be divided hetwppn thp 
—the partias^_Eroperty taxes-to-ho- s^ l-irt—by the parties 
6—Company~-s4;ock h^Ld~by-^tha—compan-y—t=rO—be sp-l-it between the parties.— 
Plaintiff will receive an immediate hardship salp and di strihnf-i on 
— o f her shaxe~, 
7. ^Db.fendant to give p l a in - t i f f 1/2 of the s-to^k—that—he-has sQ-14-&-in^B 
thp pnrtips snp^r^M'nn 
8
 Personal property has been divided in a way agrppnhlp tn hnth 
parties 
9. Defendant should be rnquirnd tn nnnt-ri'bnfp $4Q QQ In to a c o l l e g e 
fund fu^x—tho-minor ch44r4-arS—ha4~ been--the p r a e - t i e e - p r i o r to s e p a r a t i o n , 
( J K A N D TOTAL (pei month) $ 
, piopose (lie above set t lement. 
, ( P l . imhl l Dc lendan! 
11 this mallei i cq i ihesa h lal, ll will lake appioximately h o m s a n d witnesses 
will be called for tins party. 
0 i\ (\ h Q *> 
REAL ESTATE '(continued) 
Address 9775 So. 1550 W. 
So. Jordan, Ut. 
Original Cost $25,000.00 
Additions $10,000.00 
Total Cost $35,000.00 
Mtg. balance $ (5) 
Taxes $ 400.00 
Type of Property 
2 1/2 acres with barn & 
riding arena 
Date of Acquisition June 1885 
Present value $45,000.00 
Basis of valuation Costs, improvements 
some appreciation 
Address Lincoln County, Colorado (J) Type 46.89 acres 
Original Cost $9,000.00 Date 1975 
Additions None Present value ? 
Total cost $9,000.00 
Mtg. BalancQ $ 0 
Taxes $ 10-15/year 
«') f) (\ n 5.: i 
Additional expenses 
Child's allowance $ 20.00 
Horsehoeing 30.00 
Veterinary bills 20.00 
Postage, newspaper 10.00 
(HKXiKr. 
ATTACHMENT (INCOME) 
Plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the parties1 separation 
and had remained at home as a homemaker for 15 years. 
Plaintiff attempted (for over a period of 6 months to find a 
position in either law practice or other areas. 
In January 1992, plaintiff entered into an office sharing 
arrangement in Midvale in order to try and generate some 
income and increase her practical experience. In order to enter 
the practice of law, plaintiff borrowed a substantial amounnt 
of money from family. 
To this date, plaintiff is running at a deficit but is 
making some progress in covering her monthly expenses. 
She cannot project at what point her law practice will generate 
enough income to cover monthly expenses and repay start up 
costs . 
w o o <> s: <; 
STA'I IC OK UTAI1 
COUN'IT OF SALT LAKK 
s s . 
I svvc.n 11 i.i I ( l ie n uil I c i s slalcci IKMCI I I . I I C l i UP <II icl (oiu'cTT" / os> zs "—' 
^"'WUlj.ULk'iif' s w , , , ' i i • <> l>Hoir mo ( h i s 
! v^TTtt^ *mm"m'T?mmmm*——m—m I /6*-*i!?Qv -NotoiyPuhBn T 
± 
J^MAIL 
.wJtL 
Nol.uv PULIK ICSKIHU; in Sail Lake County, Utah 
Mv Commission Expnr s : //) - ?- J ' (^ 
HRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIEY OR EXPLAIN T H E STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING 
HUT NOT LIMITED TO. PAYROLL STUI3S FOR THE MOST RECENT 1)0 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
IUCTURNS. CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS. PASSH()OKS, ('HICCKHOOKS. CANCELLED CHECKS, 
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
o o o o s'; 
(h) Re al Ins ta te ( W h e r e m o i e t h a n o n e pa ie e1 ol it al e s ta te o w i u d a l lae h s l u e t w i t h ul< ntie al mfoi m a l u m lor all a d d i t i o n a l p r o p e l ty) 
A«i«i.«-ss9.7X7_So,-J.dOO W„ ( J ) -
— So. J o r d a n , - U t -_84065 
oi.n CM $ 49L7_500 -OQ 
Cos t o! A d d i t i o n s $ 
' lo t . i l T o s t $ 
M U l l a l . n n c * _ 2 5 f 0 0 0 , 0 0 
oiiui i.uns$ 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 -
I quity 1> __ 
Amoit i /ahon % 6 7 8 0 0 
laxes $ —- inc luded i n - m o r t g a g e -
Individual (ont i ihut ions 
ivi>< oi rmp(ityresJLderica__+_ L_acre._ 
D a l e ol Ac( | u i s i t i on A u g U R t - 1 5 - 7 6 . 
lcil.il I ' .ese ii( V a l u e $ _ _ 8 ? , 0 Q Q _ Q . Q _ 
Basis oi valuation ^gr^jemen±_hy_„p-arHij 
And to whomValley_ Mor tgage . 
U_S_J&ank 
(i) B u s i n e s s mle l e s t (inelu ale n a m e s h a i e type ol b u s i n e s s value le s s mele b t ee lnes s ) 
(j) O t h e i a s s e t s (Spee ily) 
G lot . i l m o n t h l y t \ p e n s e s *(Spee ily whie h p a i t v is t lu < u s t o d i a l p a i e u l a n d list n a m e a n d l e l a l i o n s h i p ol all m e m b e i s o l t h e 
h o u s e ho ld w h o s e e x p e n s e s a t e i i u l t u l t d ) 
* Diane S . - J o n e s , c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t of-
iArtiber- M.- J o n e s , - d a u g h t e r 
Rent oi moit^a^e payments (lesidenee) 
Real p.operly taxes (lesulenee) i n c l u d e d - i n - H l O r t a g e 
Real piopeity insu ianee (les.elene e i n c l u d e d i n m o r t g a g e — 
Mamie nane e (lesulent e) _ 
1 ood a n d h o u s e holel s u p p l i e s _ _ 
Utilihe s ine h i d i n g w a l e i e l e e t n e i t y ^ a ^ a i u l l u a t _ 
le le phone _ _ _ _ 
1 auneliy and e leaning 
Clothing . 
Me d u a l 
Dental _ _ 
I n s u i a i u e (lilt* a t e u l e n t e n m p t e he n s i v e li.ibilitv e l i s . ib ih t \ ) 1 xe Iuele Pay i<>H Define te el 
( lulel e a i e 
P a y m e n t ol e lulel s p o u s a l s u p p o i t j e pue>i maniai<e* 
Se lu)ol _ 
L n l e i t a mine nt (me hide s e l u b s soe lal oh lu*a tu rns l i a \ t I i ee ie a (ion) 
IIK ule u( . l i s (fM oonuni ' , te>haeee) a leo lu i l i^ills a n d e lona l i ous ) ___ 
I i.tnspoi tation (e)thei than autnmohile) 
Ante) ex|)e u s e (^as . oil l e p a u i n s u i a n e e ) _ ____ 
Ante) payme n l s __ 
I list all me nt payme nt(s) (I use 11 to t a l anel a t tae It tie mi/< el se he eiule 
il ne>t lully set l o i l h in (el) o n t h e l u s t p a ^ e ' l u ie ol) _ _ 
Oi l i n e x p e n s e ' s ( Insei t (o la l anel spe e ily o n a l tae he el se heel ule ) 
I O I A 1 I \ T I NSl S 
HUSBAND 
$ 
Wli C 
J&JSrQQ-
—SO .4)0— 
-400^-00— 
-135.-00— 
—18-. 00— 
-50^0 
-50,00— 
-8 .00-
-40-rOO-
-50-rOO— I 
KHL_Qil_ 
0 
_7Q^QQ_ 
_80_QQ. 
$ 
-1-7-29.00-
A *\ o /> n 
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
_ ) , 4*J£' 
\//>C* 
Husband. 
Addiess* _ 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
c N/£ t>A/C± 
Delcndant 
SOL. Sec No 
Occupation 
Hniploycr _ 
Birthdate. ___ 
Wile 
Address 
6 
Case No ? M ^ M T 
Financial Declaration 
Dated, t / o / y ", ' PPY 
/4A/C J^_^£^/CS_ 
?~7/-7 S 'Coo (O. 
\o O 
rn 
"X. 
o 
— ** 
m 
m 
s 
*_)>> i^SO <3 O SI AJ 
Soc. Sec. No.: SoZ f ~? P - / ? 4. 3 
Occupation ' ^ / * cy»/i/£ y 
Fin pi oyer. __^ <*-~V /"' 
HnlhcUe ^ ^ ' C ' ^ , '?&' 
a 
NO Hi THIS DECLARATION MUST BE PILED Wi l l i THE DOMESTIC CALIiNDAR CLERK S DAYS 
PRIOR 'I 0 TI Hi PRIM RIAL 11 LA RING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
ANY EALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL S U B J E C T YOU TO THE PENALTY EOR 
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
S TATEMEN'I OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NO IK: 'I o ariive nl monl til > figures when income is ieeeived and 
deductions are made week!}, mulhpl} by 4.3; if ligiues aie on a bi-ttcckly 
hasis, multiply by 2.167) 
(noss monthly income lioni 
Salaiy .ind waecs, including commissions, bonuses, 
allowances and overtime, payable _ _ 
penod) _ _ 
Pensions <uul retncment _ _ 
Social sec in ily _ _ 
Disability and unemployment msuiance 
Public assistance (welfare, AI DC payment, etc ) 
Child support Irom any poor maitiage 
Dividends and inteiesl _ _ 
Rents 
All othci souiccs (Specify) ^ ^ " ^ y . 
(pay 
TOTAL MON Hll Y INCOMh. 
Itemize monthly deductions from gioss income 
Slate and federal income taxes 
Number of exemptions taken 
Social secunty 
Medical oi othei insurance (dcscnbe fully) _ 
Union oi othei dues . 
Rctiiement oi pension fund 
S.ivmj»s pl.in _ 
HUSBAND 
% 
% 
— 
WIM« 
<Lo • r ) o 
4' S o . o o 
$ 
3o& no 
c^S'o j?_o j 
_ _ 
Other: (specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
3. Net monthly income - take home pay 
$ 
$ $ i23oy. no 
4. Debts and obligations: 
Creditor's Name For Date Payable Balance Monthly Payment 
/ > <o
 Slr ^j £j KJX. . ^  ^ /9a 7~o /!<-.. j «j 
•'V*? S T O 4 & l/Sfl 
5 V : />?,*)** 'S /X>Ss> ,?•**„ ~ / > ? £ ^ r ^ 
OJfTS-rC-HA; AJCcooc-oC't'si^ 
TOTAL 
SS* ^ / £ ' , ^ ^ P . O O 
v T ' 7 , r OT> 
.5" ?<>>(?. 3 V 
$ 
ov°v. c P 
«>?r>. o n "/• 
$ 
(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule) 
5. All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (II) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly). 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
Value Owed Thereon 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances and equipment 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) 
$ $ 
(c) Securities - stocks, bonds 
(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans, 
credit unions - savings and checking) 
(e) Life Insurance: 
/1/rWC 
Name of Company Policy No. Face Amount 
Cash value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amount 
(f) Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name __A/„CLJ\£-£.. 
Name 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify) 
(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional property) 
Address 
Original Cost $ 
Cost of Additions $ 
Total Cost $ 
Mtg. Balance $ 
Other Liens $ 
Equity $ 
Monthly Amortization _ 
Taxes $ 
Individual contributions 
Type of Property 
Date of Acquisition 
Total Present Value $_ 
Basis of Valuation 
And to whom 
(i) Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness) 
(j) Other assets (Specify) 
6. Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the househokl whose 
expenses are included.) 
_.^ ..^ MP_ *:JSL £ikj*.£Ms:c&..^-
Z_.>22r:^/QvC__C^^^a.-
Uent or mortgage payments (residence) __ 
Real property taxes (residence) - X A / C - C U O ^ ' V V,/7.\./>7.^V ?T._ 
Real property insurance (residence) '' ._ * 
Maintenance (residence) 
Pood and household supplies 
Utilities iiu hiding water, electricity, gas and heal
 f _r ec^» *,_<~._ 
Telephone .._ 
Paunchy and cleaning 
Clothing _ __ 
Medical 
Dental ._._ 
Insurance (life, accitlent, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted 
Child Care *///?.. 
Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage _j_V_/9 
School _ _ ___ _ 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation) 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gilts, and donations) 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) 
Auto payments 
Installment payment(s). (Insert total ami attach itemized schedule 
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) 
HUSBAND WIFE 
VO £\ a o 
3 So. oo 
3?. oo 
^ . o o 
So. oo 
JZJ5I.(?O_. 
so. oo 
J\______ 
/' DO. oct 
/'35~. o o 
3'______aa 
/ o o . o o 
y.s~?.^ 
STATU 0I ; UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKR 
ss. 
I swear that the matters slated herein aie true and con eel, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /V 
V^ 
day of 
AROi YN I IArEN | 
'' * *
 K
»<uifh Stale St 010'* 
f.'i'ivato, Utah A4047 
'•»y > \>mmKsion £xpiro<; 
' ohruary 2ij, 1S96 
STATK OF UTAH 
i9 ; y 
Notjfy Public lesidinli m Sail Lake Coun lo'ii g i ty, Utah 
My Commission Expues: 
BRING TO MIL PRF-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTIILR SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NFCLSSARY TO VFRIFY OR FXPLAIN Till- STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DHCLARATION, INCLUDING 
BUT NOT LIMITFD TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THH MOST RLCFNT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARP! STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CIIFCKBOOKS, CANCELLED CIIHCKS, 
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
iltlMjai'iii'* \ ) 
Proposed Settlement of Pending 
Divorce Litigation 
Child Support $ Total (per month) $ 
Alimony: Total (per month) $ 
Property Distribution: 
GRAND TOTAL (per month) $ 
I, , propose the above settlement. 
Plaintiff/Defendant 
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately 
be called for this party. 
hours and witnesses will 
OTHER EXPENSES 
Newspaper 
Child's Allowance ($15.00/wk x 4.3) 
Upkeep of Child's Horses 
Veterinary Bills 
Monthly 
$8.24 
$64.50 
$65.00 
$21.00 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONES, DIANE SHARON 
VS 
JONES, JACK LLOYD 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 914 902425 DA 
DATE 07/20/94 
HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS 
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE 
COURT CLERK CPW 
TYPE OF HEARING: PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. RICE, JOHN K 
D. ATTY. SKOUBYE, JEFF B 
COMM. RECOMMENDS THIS MATTER CERTIFIED READY FOR TRIAL. 
COMM'S PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT OF CONTESTED ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY 
COUNSEL ARE; 
1. ONLY ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT IS DEFT'S REQUEST THAT ALIMONY 
BE TERMINATED IN LIGHT OF PLTF'S INCOME INCREASING FROM $80 
PER MONTH TO $1773 PER MONTH--SUGGEST CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
HAS OCCURRED AND COURT SHOULD ENTER APPROPRIATE ALIMONY 
AWARD CONSIDERING PARTIES PRESENT FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
2. FEES --NO SUGGESTION. 
A /i A »f ft A 
Jeff B. Skoubyc - No. 6034 
Attorney for Defendant 
8282 S. State Street, Suite 18 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 562-8855 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKL COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE SHARON JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK LLOYD JONES, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JACK LLOYD JONES 
Civil No. 914902425DA 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
) 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW JACK LLOYD JONES and being duly sworn states as follows: 
1. I am the above-named Defendant, I have personal Knowledge of the matters 
set forth hereafter and I am fully competent to testify concerning these matters. 
2. The Plaintiff and I were married July 1, 1973 in Anchorage, Alaska. 
3. We have one Minor child, Amber M. Jones, Born September 3, 1979. Amber 
is presently fifteen years of age. 
4. When we were first married the Plaintiff worked out side the home for over 
'.} u c < o ; -
three years. After long discussion, it was decided that the Plaintiff would quit work and 
pursue a career in law. The Plaintiff made a commitment to me that she would not quit this 
thing in the middle. That she would follow through and become an attorney and I would 
enjoy the benefits of having a working attorney in the family. 
5. The plan was that she would go to law school. This required that we leave 
Alaska as there were no law schools in Alaska at the time. At this time we left Alaska and a 
job offer that paid over $60,000 per year so (hat the Plaintiff could attend Law School. That 
was big money in 1976. So we moved to Utah and I accepted a job that paid only $12,000 
per year, this was a very large cut in pay. 
6. The Plaintiff attended Law School from Sept 1976 until Spring of 1979 and 
became licensed to practice law (passed the bar) in the Summer of 1979. In that period the 
Plaintiff had no income, She relied totally on me for support, to pay her tuition and buy her 
law books. In other words I financed the Plaintiff's law degree. In the property settlement 
nothing was mentioned about the value of the law degree that she obtained during the 
marriage. 
7. From summer of 1979 until our separation I tried to get the Plaintiff to find 
employment or do something with her law degree instead of sitting home. This was the 
main point of contention between us all those years. The Plaintiff did do a little work in the 
years between 1979 and the time of our separation. She established a tax preparation 
business on a small scale and took on a few cases as an attorney. However she would not do 
2 
i\ i) 0 •'- ° (* 
any thing that looked like it would require a large amount of work. 
8. The Plaintiff would not keep the commitment that she made before I agreed to 
send her to law school. Bven after our daughter started school about 10 years ago, Plaintiff 
still refused to earn a living. 
9. The Plaintiff and 1 were separated in April of 1991 and divorced Sept 23, 
1992. Our divorce took almost 18 months. 
10. In a temporary order, dated in May 1991, the court granted Plaintiff temporary 
alimony at a very high rate. The court also ordered Plaintiff to find employment. Plaintiff 
failed to earnestly seek employment. She believed that I owed her a living and she did not 
have to work. The Plaintiff made the statement more than once that she would bleed me for 
every penny she could, and that is what I believe she is trying to do now. 
11. In December of 1991 The Plaintiff, decided to open a law office. This was 
not to my liking because through the alimony 1 was paying her, I was being forced to finance 
her set up in a law practice. In other words, 1 was being required to help buy her a law 
practice, when I already paid for her law degree. 
12. After she began her law practice, Plaintiff would not admit to earning any 
money. In all the discussions we had trying to reach a settlement, the Plaintiff and her 
Attorney stated many times over that the Plaintiff was not making any income from her law 
practice. They staled that all the income was being eaten up by expenses. 
13. On June 5, 1992, we were scheduled for a pretrial conference. I appeared 
3 
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with my attorney the Plaintiff was present with her attorney. At the pretrial conference we 
tried to get the Plaintiff and her attorney to admit that the Plaintiff was making an income 
from the law practice that she had started about six months earlier. If we could get them to 
admit income from this source then the amount of the alimony in question would have been 
decreased. However they would not admit that the income existed and the alimony amount 
was set based on the nighty dollars ($80.00) income from caring for horses. 
14. The alimony amount was also affected by other factors in the case. Those 
other factors included Plaintiff's receipt of the home and a large cash settlement. The fact 
that Plaintiff had obtained a law degree and became a member of the Utah State Bar financed 
by me was also included in the calculus. A settlement agreement was reached and the Judge 
granted the Divorce based on our agreement. 
15. I did not like this settlement agreement because it included alimony. It was 
my position that the plaintiff should not be entitled to alimony because she had a law degree 
and was a member of the Utah State Bar. It is my fervent belief that the Plaintiff is totally 
capable of earning more money than me. The fact that the Plaintiff refused to use her degree 
and license for so many years should have made it so alimony was out of the question. I 
wanted at the time of the pretrial hearing to go on to trial so that my attorney could argue 
that point. He refused, as he said it "Judge Wilkinson will not hear this case, the judge has 
ordered us to settle." I am sorry now that I did not stick to what I felt at that time and insist 
that we go to trial. 
4 
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16. A short time after the pretrial conference, we discovered that our settlement 
could not be executed because our agreement called for a division of my Deferred Income 
Plan. The Division of my Deferred Income Plan was not allowed by my employer. 
17. The Plaintiff and I then went back to the negotiating table without our 
attorneys. We hammered out an agreement that I could live with. It called for a declining 
rate of alimony that would decrease each year to zero in five years. The alimony would be 
decreased to a livable level in a year or two. We agreed that the Plaintiff was to have the 
agreement put in final form and I was to sign it, and that would be the end of this terrible 
mess. The Plaintiff went to her attorney and they draw up the agreement. When I received 
a copy of what they came up with, it was not anything like what I agreed to earlier. Because 
that paper was not what I agreed to I would not sign it. 
18. The Plaintiff filed a court action to force me to sign that paper. Instead of 
going to court, my attorney scheduled a conference with the Plaintiff, her Attorney, himself 
and me in his office. In this conference we hammered out another agreement and reduced 
the agreement to paper with us all still present. 
19. The agreement that we made was based on the Plaintiff having an income of 
$80 per month. Plaintiff and her attorney would never admit that her law practice had any 
income that was not eaten up by expenses. It was also based on the fact that the plaintiff 
would get a very large cash settlement of $14,250, all the equity in the family home, and 
almost all of the other marital property. Had the calculation of alimony hinged upon income 
of the Plaintiff of $1,426 per month, I would not have agreed to (he alimony provided in the 
Stipulation since such an amount of income along with the child support of $430 per month 
would have been sufficient for Plaintiff to have met her own monthly expenses of $1,439.10 
per month and maintained herself at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage 
20. In our agreement, we also agreed (hat I would have access to (he Plaintiffs 
business records every six monlhs so that as soon as the income of the Plaintiff went up from 
$80 per month, 1 could pel it ion the court (o dcciease the alimony. 
21. The agreement stated that I was to pay child support of $430 which was 
consistent with the laws of the Slate of Utah. I was not concerned about an increase in 
Plaintiff's income increasing child support since an increase in her income would also 
allocate more of the child support to her and have very little effect on my child support 
obligation. 
22. In November of 1992, my attorney advised me that I could gain access to 
Plaintiffs business records since it had been over six months since I had access to them. My 
attorney made the request for the records in Novembei. In December of 1992 we received a 
letter from the Plaintiffs attorney stating that they would not comply with (he request 
because it had not been six months since the divorce date of September 23 1992. And that I 
was behind in my support payments. This was not true, I was never any more than a few 
days late with the support payments. My attorney explained to me that the payments were 
not late unless they were more than 30 days late and they were never 30 days late. 
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23. I finally obtained the business records in the latter part of March, 1993. The 
records clearly showed an increase in income. So on the advice of my attorney we filed a 
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce to terminate alimony. It is now apparent that 
the Plaintiff is earning more than her expenses and that her income has more than 
compensated for the alimony I am paying her. 
24. In the Plaintiff's latest financial declaration there is an item that should not be 
allowed to be included as expenses. This item is the car payment of nearly $400. The 
luxury of owning a car valued at about $20,000 is not something that I enjoyed in all the time 
of my marriage with the plaintiff nor do I enjoy that kind of thing now. During our marriage 
the most expensive cars we owned were a new AMC Javelin which we purchased for 
approximately $3,400 and a used Thunderbird purchased for approximately $5,000. The 
monthly payments on these cars was never over $100 to $150 per month. The Plaintiff is 
now living above the standard of living enjoyed during our marriage. 
25. Because there has been a substantial increase in Plaintiff's income since the 
time of divorce and the Plaintiff is now able to support herself and provide for herself the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, my obligation to pay alimony should be 
terminated retroactive to the date of the petition for modification. 
26. I have made numerous attempts to negotiate with Plaintiff a decrease in my 
alimony obligation. However, Plaintiff has flatly refused to even entertain any settlement 
offers despite my clear entitlement to a termination of alimony and despite the requirement of 
7 
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(he court that the parties enter into meaningful negotiations. Plaintiff has also taken every 
opportunity to delay these proceedings. Due to Plaintiffs refusal to negotiate meaningfully 
and her delay of these proceedings, I have been forced to incur substantial attorneys fees. It 
is only reasonable and cquilable that I should be awarded my attorneys fees incurred in 
pursuing this action for modification and defending against Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
27. Plaintiff has not incurred any attorneys (cos in proceeding in this case due to 
her ability to swap legal services. Therefore, it is reasonable and equitable that Plaintiff be 
ordered to pay all, or at least a portion of my attorneys fees incurred in pursuing this action. 
28. In my divorce settlement I was awarded a large amount of money. I put this 
money in savings. Because of the fact that in the past three and one half years I have had to 
pay over $42,000 in alimony and child support to the Plaintiff plus thousands of dollars in 
attorney fees, the large savings has been totally depleted. 
DATED this JJ? day of September, 1994. 
' > *\ r !\ k • 
ORIGINAL "fswi judicial DL. ... 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICXEccouwv . 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE S. JONES, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
JACK L. JONES, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPQEIER1S_PARTIAL 
il3£NSCRiPT_QF_HEARING 
QN_.t!QIIQN_.EQE'_iUt!t!ARY 
jyDGMENI_AND_CROSSz 
dQIIQN_FgR~SyNMARY 
JUDGMENT:. QQURTIS_RIJLING 
CIVIL MO. 914902425 
HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE i4TH_DAY_QF 
QQIQiEBi_i22^ i CONTINUING IN THE IO:00 A.M. LAW AND MOTION 
CALENDAR, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CONTINUED IN HEARING IN 
COURTROOM NO. 502 OF THE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF 
JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
<2QHN_!<i_RIQEjL_ATT0RNEY-AT-LAW, 7434 SOUTH STATE 
STREET, SUITE 102, MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 TELEPHONE 568-1500 
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
JEEE_5i_iKDyBYEA_ATT0RNEYzAT-LAW, 8282 SOUTH 
STATE STREET, SUITE 18, MIDVALE, UTAH 84 047 TELEPHONE 562-8855 
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT. 
ORIGINAL 
0 0 0 7a 7 
1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED 
2 IN OPEN COURT:) 
3 THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. COUNSEL FOR 
4 THE DEFENSE ARGUED THAT THERE ARE THREE THINGS THE COURT CAM 
5 LOOK AT AS FAR AS WHAT WAS CONTEMPLATED: WHETHER THERE'S BEEN 
6 A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THE LAST ONE, ON THE MERITS, AS 
7 I'VE REVIEWED THIS MATTER, THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION, AND I 
8 SO RULE, THAT AT THE TIME THIS STIPULATION WAS DRAWN UP, AND I 
9 AGREE WITH WHAT COUNSEL SAYS; THE STIPULATION SHOULD BE 
10 ADHERED TO AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
11 THE PARTIES DID ANTICIPATE THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
12 WAS GOING TO COMMENCE A LAW PRACTICE, THAT SHE HAD NOT BEEN IN 
13 EXTENSIVE WORK AS FAR AS THE LAW UP TO THAT TIME. THERE'S A 
14 DISPUTE; THEY SAY £80 IN THE DECREE, YET THE PLEADINGS OR-
IS THE—WELL, THE PLEADINGS, THE MEMORANDUM ARGUES THE PROPERTY 
16 WAS SOLD. AND MY UNDERSTANDING IS IT WAS SOLD BEFORE OR AT 
17 THE TIME THE DECREE WAS ENTERED, WHICH MAY MEAN SHE DIDN'T 
18 HAVE ANY INCOME. 
19 IF THAT WAS THE CASE, COUNSEL ARGUES THAT SHE 
20 HAD INCOME OF $872 IN HIS PLEADINGS. I DON'T THINK IT MAKES 
21 THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE EITHER WAY, WHETHER SHE DID OR DIDN'T, OR 
22 WHAT IT WAS. I THINK THAT THE PARTIES, THE WAY THEY WORDED 
23 THAT, ANTICIPATED THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GOING TO START A LAW 
24 PRACTICE AND THAT EVERY SIX MONTHS THAT SHE WOULD MAKE KNOWN 
25 TO THE DEFENDANT WHAT HER EARNINGS WERE. 
ft 0 0 7 fs S 
WITHIN ONE MONTH AFTER THE DIVORCE, THE 
DEFENDANT STARTED TO INQUIRE INTO IT, WHICH WAG IN VIOLATION, 
THAT THE INCREASE AG FAR AG HER LAW PRACTICE WAG CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE PARTIES. 
THE OUrGTJON 1G: WHEN IT GOT TO AN AMOUNT THAT 
WOULD BE GUFF1C1ENI TO CUT BACI OR TO TERMINATE THE ALIMONY. 
THE COURT IS UF THE OPINION THAT THIS WAS 
CONTEMPLATED BY 1 HE PART LEG AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE DECREE, 
AND THAT THE AMOUNT HAG NOT REACHED A POINT OF WHERE THE 
ALIMONY WOULD BE TERMINATED. 
THE COURT IS ALSO OF THE OPINION THAT LOOPING 
AT IT, THE SECOND IGGUE AG TO WHAT THE DEFENSE ARGUES AG FAR 
AG CHANGE Or CIRCUMSTANCEG, THERE HAS NOT BEEN A SUFFICIENT 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PARTIES' INCOME TO WARRANT THE 
TERMINATION OF ALIMONY. 
THE COURT WOULD ALSO INDICATE TO THE PARTIES 
THAT LF THIS MATTER WAG BEFORE ME ON THE SAME EVIDENCE WHICH 
YOU'VE ARGUED IN YOUR MEMORANDA, THAT THE COURT WOULD NOT 
TERMINATE ALIMONY BAGED ON THE OVERALL PICTURE AS FAR AS THE 
PARTIES ARE CONCERNED. 
THEREFORE I'M GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE PLAJNTJFF WILL PREPARE THE PLEADINGS. 
] WILL AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES FOR THE PLAINTIFF ALSO. I WANT AN 
AFFIDAVIT ON THEM, THOUGH. I DON'T FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH THE 
AMOUNT WHICH YOU'VE STATED. 
MR. SKOUBYE: YOUR HONOR, WITH RESPECT TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES, ALSO THE PLAINTIFF HAS—. 
THE COURT: I WOULD DENY THE DEFENDANT'S 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
MR. SKOUBYE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I WAS 
GOING TO ASK, THOUGH, YOUR HONOR, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES, SHE HAS NOT ACTUALLY INCURRED ANY 
OUT-OF-POCKET ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND, COUNSEL. I'VE READ 
IT, AND I UNDERSTAND HOW IT'S BEEN DONE, AND THOSE ARE STILL 
ATTORNEYS FEES THAT COULD BE INCURRED. 
MR. RICE: YOUR HONOR, ONE POINT OF 
CLARIFICATION: I'LL SUBMIT THAT AFFIDAVIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS. 
HOW DOES THE COURT WANT TO PROCEED THEN IN RULING ON THE 
AMOUNTS? YOU'LL JUST SIMPLY ISSUE YOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION? 
THE COURT: WELL, SUBMIT THE AFFIDAVIT ON THE 
ATTORNEYS FEES. COUNSEL CAN RESPOND TO IT, AND THEN I'LL MAKE 
A DECISION AS TO HOW MUCH—WHAT I THINK REASONABLE IS. 
MR. RICE: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 
(TRANSCRIBED BY ALISON HOLLADAY) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT 
THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME 
STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AMD PLACES HEREIN SET 
FORTH; THAT SAID REPORT WAS, BY ME, SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED TO BE 
REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 4, 
BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A 
TRUE AMD CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AMD PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
28TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1994, AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
ED MIDOLEY, RPR,'CM 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NQ. 133) 
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JOHN K. RICE, USB #4397 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. BOX 896 
17 North Main 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 568-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE S. JONES, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JACK L. JONES, 
Defendant. ] 
i SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 914902425 
> Judge Homer Wilkinson 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing this 14th 
day of October, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the Honorable 
Judge Homer Wilkinson presiding; John K. Rice, attorney, appeared 
for and on behalf of the Plaintiff and Jeff B. Skoubye, attorney, 
appeared for and on behalf of the Defendant; the parties having 
filed cross motions Cor summary judgment supported by their 
respective memoranda, pleadings and affidavits, the Court having 
reviewed all such motions, memoranda, pleadings and affidavits as 
well as the record herein, the Court also having heard the 
argument of counsel for both parties, the Court otherwise being 
fully advised in the premises and for good cause shown therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
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1. That the Plaintiff's income from her law practice is 
contemplated in the decree of divorce itself and the parties' 
contemplated Plaintiff's income from her law practice at the time 
they entered into their alimony settlement agreement; 
2. That the Defendant has not genuinely controverted any 
material fact sufficient to preclude granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff; 
3. That, in addition, the Court has considered the 
Defendant's facts, including those that Defendant contends are 
disputed. Even considering all such facts, the Defendant has 
failed to establish any material facts sufficient to meet his 
burden of showing a substantial or material change in the income 
of the parties that was not contemplated by them as part of their 
alimony settlement agreement or in the divorce decree at the time 
of entry, and, even if the same facts were before the Court for a 
trial upon the merits, Defendant has not shown any reasonable 
probability of prevailing at trial. 
4. That the Defendant is not entitled to a reduction or 
termination of alimony at this time. 
5. That the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is 
granted and the Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree 
of Divorce is dismissed with prejudice. 
6. That the Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment 
is denied. 
7. That the Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree 
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of Divorce was without merit and not brought in good faith and 
the Plaintiff is therefor entitled to an award of her attorney 
fees incurred in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-27-
56 (1956), as amended. The Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees 
in the defense of the Defendant's petition for modification in 
the reasonable amount of $4,146.00 and Plaintiff is granted 
judgment against Defendant for said amount. 
8. That the Defendant's request for an award of attorney 
fees and costs is denied and Defendant shall bear his own costs 
and attorney fees. , — — 
DATED this J> day of Pfeeewber-?—1-9-94-. 
BY THE COURT: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, to the 
following: 
Jeff Skoubye 
Attorney at Law 
8282 South State Street, #18 
Midvaie, Utah 84047 
DATED this /<£ day of December, 1994. 
* s. / /. 
1/ ' / / 
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